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ABSTRACT
Nationalist sentiment has a long history in the Basque regions of northern Spain.
Culturally separate from the dominant Castilian society, separatists have for many years
advocated for an independent Basque state. Following democratic reforms under the
Constitution of 1978, regional cultures and languages were explicitly recognized and
protected in Spain. This allowed for the current set of language laws in the Autonomous
Community of País Vasco in which Castilian Spanish and the Basque language of
Euskara are held in equal status and recognition. Furthermore, Euskara has been
recognized as a defining characteristic of Basque identity. The regional government has
instituted a three-track education system in which students choose to be taught in varying
ratios of Euskara and Castillian. This work explores ideas about language education and
usage as it relates to the development of national identity in young people in the city of
Bilbao. It shows that the everyday choices made about language in the region are
complicated and not merely reflections of nationalist ideology. There are often pragmatic
choices made reflecting economic realities or simple daily convenience. These basic
trends though are further complicated by normal adolescent social negotiations. The
language of Euskara is still an important identifier for individuals in the region, but there
are now many perceived reasons for achieving fluency in it other than to make a political
or cultural statement. These results illustrate a complicated picture of nationalism in the
region and raise questions about its shifting focus and importance in future generations.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The idea of “Europe” today is often one of states operating together in relative
harmony and setting a collective standard for the model of a socially democratic society.
This image is especially fostered under the auspices of the European Union. The EU has
been undergoing an integration process for more than half a century, tying states together
through economic interdependence, legal directives, and open internal borders. However,
the image that is presented by European leaders – that of a unified, respectful community
operating in harmony and peace – glosses over many of the underlying tensions found in
this system. The EU has arguably done a remarkable job at completing its original
objective in preventing continental war between states through economic integration.
However, this integration and lack of war has not necessarily translated into tamping
down the nationalist sentiments that so readily contributed to conflict in the past. It has
rather coincided with the development of multiple competing conversations about
citizenship and identity in Europe today. There are conversations still about competing
national identities at the state as well as the sub-state levels. In addition, there is
discussion about the development and role of multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism,
discourses of tolerance, and cultural assimilation in European societies.
These discussions about identity are often tied in with those about language policy
and public usage. These are not just conversations that surround debates about immigrant
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populations; rather, they often also involve “traditional” European minority groups. Even
in the European Union – which has 23 official and working languages – there are a
plethora of regional minority languages which are supposedly protected by EU directive.
These minority languages are oftentimes perceived as being integral to regional, sub-state
identities that are separate from those propounded by the state government or the EU
offices in Brussels. This study seeks to examine these issues – the role and changing
nature of nationalism and national identity in Europe and the impact of specific language
policies – through a very specific case in the Basque region of northern Spain. Sited in
the Autonomous Community of País Vasco, it considers the relationship between
language education and daily language usage among young people and their developing
senses of identity.
País Vasco serves as a useful site for this study because there is a long history of
nationalist sentiment in the Basque regions. Culturally separate from the dominant
Castilian society with their own distinct regional language, separatists have for many
years advocated for an independent Basque state. Through the centuries the region has
exercised varying levels of autonomy until the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939
which resulted in the rise of Francisco Franco, the centralization of power in Madrid, and
the attempted suppression of regional identities. Following democratic reforms under the
Constitution of 1978, regional cultures and languages were explicitly recognized and
protected in Spain. This allowed for the current set of language laws in the Autonomous
Community of País Vasco in which Castilian Spanish and the Basque language of
Euskara are held in equal status and recognition. Throughout all of this Euskara has come
to be recognized as the most common marker of Basque identity. With wide-ranging
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autonomy granted to it from the central government in Madrid, a nationalist dominated
regional government instituted a three-track education system based on instruction in
varying ratios of Euskara and Castillian. This project explores the relationship between
language education and the development of national identity in Basque young people in
the city of Bilbao, Spain. It also ponders the role and meaning of this identity as these
young people face the continued integration and increased globalization of the EU at the
same time that there is substantial financial uncertainty in the region.
This project then is centered on three main questions. First, how are how are multiple
national political projects reflected in language policy in País Vasco? Given that
nationalist governments put these policies in place and have continued to revise them
over time, it is important to understand the ways in which the ideologies underpinning
various political movements might be seen in the policies which govern language,
particularly in a school setting. Second, why do parents (and to a lesser extent young
people) make certain school and language education choices? Are these reflective of
nationalist sentiments or something else? Parents are legally entitled to decide which
language model school their child enters. At the most basic level this would seem to be
based on which language the child is most familiar or, in the face of nationalist rhetoric,
the position a parent takes on Basque nationalism. However, there may be other and
possibly more complex issues to consider. Third, how are young people’s daily language
choices and usages informed by the various political projects operating in País Vasco? In
an officially bilingual society in which language usage can have a very political meaning,
we can question whether actual daily usage reflects these political connotations or has
different, possibly more pragmatic, meanings.
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This project is organized in order to address these questions first at the theoretical and
then at the empirical level. The first chapter of this work examines academic literature
organized around three central themes. It first begins with a section discussing the origins
of nationalism and the theoretical development of national identity. This first section also
addresses current discussions about the role of nationalism, multiculturalism, and
associated theories in Europe today. Acknowledging the role that language plays in the
development of nationalist movements, the second section in this chapter examines the
usage and role of language policies in society in general and in language education
specifically. The last section examines ideas about youth populations, spaces, and
identities as well as their political agency. Throughout this chapter I examine the
competing interests that come from sub-state and state-centric national projects, as well
as the competing projects of the European Union.
The second chapter presents project context and explains the methodological
framework in which the research fieldwork was conducted. In it I explain the process for
selecting informants and provide basic demographic information about them with special
attention paid to explaining the subset of young people who made up the primary
informant group. There is a brief discussion about the site city of Bilbao and why
understanding its context in the region is important for understanding the study. The
chapter ends by describing briefly the type of analysis done, explaining the terminology
used throughout this project, and underscoring researcher positionality throughout the
work.
The third chapter provides information necessary to understanding the historical setting
and context for the current political situation in País Vasco. This chapter has two main
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sections. The first describes the historical and political development of the Basque
provinces of Spain, culminating with the creation and current status of País Vasco today.
In doing so, it also traces the history of Basque nationalist movements and the varying
levels of autonomy from the Spanish central state that have underpinned the Basque
political system for centuries. In explaining these historical developments, I provide
information that allows the reader to examine project analysis in historic context than just
the past few decades specifically mentioned by most informants. The second section of
this chapter builds on this by explaining the development and standardization of Euskara
and the structure of the Basque education system today. This allows the reader to
understand the complexities that arise when discussing the language itself, as well as to
understand the school choices that parents and students face when beginning a child’s
education.
The fourth chapter discusses the data collected and provides some analysis of it. This
analysis covers several main themes: school choice and the perception of each of the
school models available to students; youth spaces, social interactions, and daily language
negotiations; and understandings of political projects in País Vasco. Throughout this
analysis I contend that while nationalist rhetoric and feelings do sometimes play roles in
school and language choices, so too do pragmatic decisions such as desirability as an
employee or acclimation to a multilingual region. I also discuss the ways in which
various national projects become meaningful to young people, ranging from the regional
Basque nationalists to the Spanish state to civic ideals pushed by the European Union. I
end with a brief discussion about what this possibly means for the future of nationalist
movements in País Vasco.
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The fifth and final chapter of this project is a brief summation of prior information
and concluding remarks on it. In particular, I posit questions about what exactly the case
of the Basque region can tell us about nationalism and the development of national
identity today. It also includes suggestions for future research to future flesh out these
ideas.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE
This project explores the relationship between language education and the
development of national identity in youth populations. Three distinct yet related literary
themes which need to be explored. Throughout this project, I seek broadly to explore how
different political projects are incorporated into language policies in the Basque region,
how different nation-building projects become meaningful to young people in the region,
and how schools and other social spaces serve as sites in which nation-building projects
and language policies come together for young people. These questions recognize that
there are multi-scalar national projects competing at the state, sub-state, and European
levels in Spain. Basque nationalists seek to impose their national identity through
conscious and unconscious means just as Spanish nationalists centered in Madrid want to
subvert the regional ideologies with their own symbols. At the same time there are
European ideals at work which further complicate the issue. However, this work develops
the idea that the development of national identity in the Basque region today is complex
and internally negotiated by indivudals. Rather than being imposed by elites, a variety of
personal choices and societal pressures affect the way in which young people identify.
The following analysis draws of three bodies of literature: 1) nationalism and
national identity, 2) language development and language education, and 3) youth
development and spaces. In this order each of the succeeding sections builds on the
previous ones and constructs the framework within which this project is based.
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2.1: NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
This discussion starts with the idea of nationalism and how it has developed over
time. Understanding this basic concept is important because it lays the groundwork on
which things like national language policies are based. Nationalist rhetoric is employed in
educational policies that are enacted in schools and thus conveyed to young people. In
order to understand how those messages and national projects become meaningful to
young people and the role spaces such as schools play in that process, the grounding
provided by this literature is essential.
The terms nation, state, and nation-state are often confused in vernacular speech,
but for this project must be understood as independent concepts. “The institution of the
nation-state represents an amalgam of two entities: the state as a set of political
institutions and the nation, conceived of as the political and cultural community of
people” (Holton 1998). The state is territorial, a structural manifestation of power that
operates as the governing authority within given boundaries. The nation, in contrast, is
not government but rather a community of individuals who conceive themselves and/or
are conceived by others conceived to be bound together by common cultural ties – be
they language, ethnicity, religion, origins, destiny or otherwise – which can then be
manifested as a group identity and political will. The concept of the nation-state is one in
which these two ideas are melded together to signify a state apparatus constituted by and
through a single united people – the nation – within it. Nationalism represents the
ideological articulation of peoplehood and sovereignty as it rises out of and often acts in
concert with these ideas. However bound up the terms may be though, they are not
synonymous. This has become the dominant mode of political-territorial organization in
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the modern world. The assumption of congruence between nation and state and the
conflation of these terms masks the fact that the structural entity of the state may not be
coterminous with the “community of people” upon which it seeks to impose its will and
may in fact contain several such communities that are actively engaged in the process of
self-constitution. Furthermore, even these “communities” are themselves actively
constructed and are never pre-existing.
Nationalism has been defined as the “modern social and political formations that
draw together feelings of belonging, solidarity and identification between national
citizens and the territory imagined as their collective national homeland” (Sparke 2011).
Nationalism can also be described as “(1) the attitude that the members of a nation have
when they care about their identity as members of that nation and (2) the actions that the
members of a nation take in seeking to achieve (or sustain) some form of political
sovereignty” (Miscevic 2010). Lastly, Haas concisely defines it as “the convergence of
territorial and political loyalty irrespective of competing foci of affiliation” (1986). These
definitions of nationalism suggest, first, the ideological practices and discourses that
construct and sustain one “national” identity over another suggests some claim to group
sovereignty – they are people with similar origins and common destiny. Second,
nationalism is inherently political and ideological. Third, nationalism is also directly tied
to the idea and claims of territorial sovereignty.
The creation of a national identity
There are competing theories describing the historical development of national
identity which have different implications for understanding the role of nationalism in
current societies and how nationalist movements function within the framework provided
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by a global system, the European Union, and Spain itself. These theories fall into two
camps, one that views nationalism purely as a product of modernity and the other that
traces nationalist sentiment to more ancient processes of identity, termed here primitive
theories. Primitive theories are labeled as such not because they are necessarily less
developed but rather because they rely on an understanding of national identity that
stretches back into ancient – or primitive – epochs of history. Modernist theories receive
their designation because they understand national identity as being rooted in much more
recent times and events – specifically in “modernity”, an explicit historic time period.
The idea of a primitive development of national identity is an interesting but
somewhat flawed notion. Expounded particularly by Anthony Smith, this conception of
nationalism sees it as a “primitive” idea, often wrapped up in the idea of ethnic origin
(Smith 1993). He labels these groups ethnos, building on terminology coming from
ancient Greece used to describe “a band or host or tribe”. Building up from this, Smith
says that groups which share common cultural traits or kinship form an ethnos. These
groups, he contends, form the ethnic core at the heart of modern state development.
While he may admit that national identity is a recent development in history, Smith
nonetheless feels that it grows out of this older ethnic underpinning. It is important to
note here though that Smith is not to be equated with “primordial” or strict primitive
views of national development. He acknowledges the modern development of national
identity but sees is as rooted in the deeper past. He does not, however, adopt the
extremely flawed view of nineteenth century theorizing or ultra-nationalist demagogues
who hold identity to be a linear development from the proverbial mists of time.
Nevertheless, even though Smith’s ideas are not hardline primordialism, they are

10

problematic. To argue that ancient ethnos formed the core of modern national
development is to ignore the role of modern elites in the process.
However, Smith’s work is useful in that he highlights the quasi-religious aspects
of modern nationalism (see also Haas 1986). Because nationalism has the seeming ability
to evoke emotions and loyalty found only else in deep-rooted “real” religion and a
person’s “powerful sense of the sacred” (Smith 2004, 26) it can be said to be an inheritor
of pre-existing religious impulses (Smith 1993). In this way, though nationalism does not
have the trappings of what we consider traditional religion; it can form a kind of secular,
civil religion. Rather than temples and churches, its services are carried out in
government buildings and monuments. As opposed to priests and rabbis, nationalism’s
prophets are the political leaders who expound its supposed truths. This conception of
nationalism as a civil religion elevates national citizens to the level of “chosen people” or
“the elect” who have a divine right to possess territory (Smith 2004). In this way, quasireligious fervor drives the territorial demands of nationalist movements.
Whereas theories of development such as Smith’s hold that the nationalist strains
we see in modern society arise from a pre-existing ethnos, modernist theories situate
nationalism in more recent past. Benedict Anderson describes nationalism as “imagined
communities”, socially constructed entities imagined by the people who perceive
themselves to be a part of the group (Anderson 1991). This idea is predicated in the fact
that individuals will imagine themselves bonded across time and space with members of
the “community” they have not even met. “The members of even the smallest nation will
never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the
minds of each lives the image of their communion” (1991, 6). Thus the term “imagined”
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is used because there is not actually widespread interaction or communication between
members of the nation; rather, it is an internalized community held together in the minds
of the individuals who feel themselves a part of it. Anderson contends that this
development is a modern phenomenon, directly traceable even to the development of the
vernacular printing press, a literate population, and the accompanying easy dissemination
of the written word (Anderson 1991). Through the dissemination of printed information
in the vernacular, a common discourse emerged among various locales and dialects,
standardizing communication. In this way the first modern nation-states emerged in
Europe around “national print-languages”.
Similarly, Hobsbawm (1992) takes a modernist approach and credits elites with
fabricating the ideas behind national identities and traditions before foisting them on the
lower rungs of society, aided as it were by these new methods of information sharing.
Though taking a different tact than Anderson, Hobsbawm is nonetheless in sympathy
with him because while he does focus on construction by elites, he still acknowledges
nationalism’s less-than-natural roots. Rather than being the result of almost instinctive
groupings based off ancient ethnies, “nations” are in fact entities created out of disparate
ethno-linguistic groups and cultures, often only unified “by a lengthy process of violent
conquest” (Hall et al. 1996, 616). The violence that unites disparate groups into a nation
can be both physical violence, enacted through warfare, and a more ephemeral, almost
psychological violence. In order for national unity to occur, the conglomerated entities
must establish a new, hegemonic order at the expense of subverting many of the other,
competing identities (Billig 1995; Hall et al. 1996; Hutchinson and Smith 1995; Alonso
1994). This is often done through a campaign of inculcation in which new stories of
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origin and national struggle are passed down to citizens as well as through the creation of
symbols that signify the new nation and become widely recognizable (Billig 1995; Hall et
al. 1996). In this somewhat intangible war of ideas and symbols, violence can be
metaphorical as languages, cultural forms, memories, and norms, are destroyed and
replaced by others. Simultaneously, though, it can be physical as people defending each
identity position struggle with each other or as individuals seek to force linguistic or
cultural minorities to assimilate – or else expel or relocate them. Indeed, the hegemonic
power may even seek to reach into the private realm by outlawing private maintenance or
observance of identity practices. We see such subjugating of competing identities
particularly in nineteenth century Europe as national movements acted as “movements
for national unification or expansion” (Hobsbawm 1992). Those territories and peoples
integrated into new nation-states were expected to be “nationally homogeneous” and so
had to adopt a new identity in order to emphasize unification. A sense of citizenship and
belonging in the newly consolidated, “liberal” states was tied to adopting this new sense
of identity which subverted any of those previously held by individuals (Hobsbawm
1992).
As nationalism seeks to subvert competing identities, it must also contend with
resistance to homogenization from with the process. The logic of nationalism results in
competing claims of peoplehood and sovereignty. This results in a lack of legitimacy for
the central state and dominant nationalism, which can result in minority group struggles
for autonomy or even secession. Thus, while nationalism is often seen as a unifying and
homogenizing force (e.g. Billig 1995; Hall et al. 1996; Hobsbawm 1992) but it can also
be seen as fragmenting as those subordinated in the new order begin to resist state
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centralization and dominant nationalist policies. Furthermore, sub-state groups seeking
recognition as a nation may transcend fixed territorial boundaries on a map and challenge
sovereignty and integrity of not just a single state but multiple states through
irrendentism. They present a challenge to the existing order of states with its rigidly
imposed boundaries on territory by seeking defined boundaries of their own. By this
token, attempting to develop a sense of national identity is both unifying and
fragmentary.
Banal nationalism and everyday flagging
The modernist perspective emphasizes the everyday construction of national
identity – that is the way nationalism is lived, practiced and internalized by the citizenry.
Michael Billig uses the term “banal nationalism” to describe how national sentiment
plays out in the everyday experience (1995). The idea of banal nationalism plays a central
role in this project, which examines the role of language education and everyday
language usage in youth identity formation. The idea of banal nationalism holds that
minute details in everyday life reinforce a sense of national identity in an unconscious
and ordinary, “taken-for-granted” manner; this applies to linguistic policies, which can
subtly reinforce nationalist orientations, consciousness, and ways of thinking.
Billig defines nationalism as “the ideological means by which nation-states are
reproduced”(Billig 1995, 6). This hearkens back to Hobsbawm’s and Anderson’s
arguments that nationalism and nation-building projects are modern developments, often
pushed by elites. Nationalism is inherently political, and banal nationalism is a means of
advancing political ideology, specifically that of the elites, attempting to push a particular
agenda. Billig argues that rather than waning, habits of nationalist reproduction are
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indicated or “flagged” in daily life. This means that the institution of a nation-state does
not end the process of nation-building. Rather, the work continuously occurs through
more subtle, perhaps even unintentional means. Again, in Billig’s words, “nationalism,
far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition”
(Billig 1995, 6). This endemic character is reflected in the actions, language, and
symbolic displays which reinforce and naturalize national identity. Importantly, the
constant reiteration of nationalism is unconscious when viewed by the citizen. Rather
than obtrusive rallying cries, these elements of banal nationalism simply reflect a latent
identity which is always present (Alonso 1994). In this way, Billig makes sure to
differentiate between “the flag waved by Serbian ethnic cleansers and that hanging
unobtrusively outside the US post office” (Billig 1995, 6). The internalized feelings of
nationalism which are reinforced by Billig’s banal settings provides an opportunity to
understand the “grass-roots” development of nationalism as opposed to that being
promulgated by a top-down, state-centric hierarchy.
The advancement of post-national identity and a European context
As we have seen, modernist definitions of nationalism emphasize that nationstates and nationalist ideologies developed in Europe, especially in the nineteenth
century. However, today we live in a world in which globalization is growing, the world
is becoming more interconnected, and some argue the nation-state is decreasing in
importance as transnational communication and transportation increase. These
conversations about nationalism have come up against concurrent ideas of postnationalism, cosmopolitanism, and the like. These new ideas suggest new modes of
identity, politics, and institutions that are not situated in or contained by nation-states and
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historic senses of nationalism but rather transnational political institutions which
increasingly have an impact on global affairs (Matuštík 1993; Holton 1998; Smith 2010).
These “post-national” trends complicate the modernist conceptualization of nationalism
and the nation-state by de-centering the role of the state from conversations of identity.
In the case of País Vasco and Spain, much of this discussion takes place in the
context of European integration under the auspices of the European Union. Since World
War II, Europe has slowly been going through an integrative process. Initially begun as
part of an effort to create economic stability among a select few states, the European
project has come to encompass greater depth and breadth (Tiersky, Jones, and Genugten
2011). As part of integration in the European Union, old ways of demarcating difference
between states have been slowly disappearing as political integration began in the 1990s
under the Maastrict Treaty and as proposals such as the Schengen Treaty insuring free
movement between signatories came into force (Deflem and Pampel 1996; Soysal 1996).
In addition, because of political integration in Europe, citizens of EU member states are
granted EU citizenship, which complements their national citizenship. This grants
citizens of the EU the right to move freely, to seek employment, and to seek aid and
protection from EU institutions throughout the entirety of the Union (Tiersky, Jones, and
Genugten 2011). This means that citizens of these states enact their citizenship rights not
just at a nation-state level, but on multiple scales (Nagel 2011). Individuals, some
suggest, are now more able to decouple themselves from a state-centric conception of
identity because they are no longer tied to their “home” nation-state in defining their
relationship to other Europeans (Smith 1992). Rather, by virtue of having multi-scalar
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citizenship rights and practices, European citizens are now able assume a sense of
European identity at the supranational level (Becher 1996; Deflem and Pampel 1996).
Some argue that this development of a “post-national” identity is a “natural”
progression in Europe. Delanty (1995) says that “one of the most striking features of
European identity is that the dynamics involved in its invention are not unlike the
processes by which regional identities were superseded by national identities in the
nineteenth century”, echoing opinions held by Becher (1996) and Smith (1992). He says
that this identity, like that of nationality, was born out of adversity. The adversity he
refers to relates to the aftermath of World War II and the later the Cold War. The idea of
post-national sentiment superseding national identity follows the model previously
mentioned in which national identities supplant subnational ones. In order for national
identity to be developed, competing visions of the nation must be suppressed by the
dominant discourse (Billig 1995; Hall et al. 1996). In the same way, the development of
post-national identity requires the suppression or at least pushing aside of identity tied to
the nation-state, especially identities that have been historically problematic such as in
the Balkans. This elevation of European identity is actively supported at the supranational
level as the EU not only pushes for education on what it means to be a European citizen
but as it enforces minimal standards for civil and minority rights, holding that these
values are a “European” ideal (Wringe 1996; Deflem and Pampel 1996). However, it
must be noted that not all commentators hold that a sense of European identity is
constructed by these shared civil values. Some, such as Tony Judt (2005) in his
comprehensive historical work, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, find an
overarching European identity, while serving some sense of civil good, to be based in
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economic terms. While wealth redistribution and economic legislation may be veiled in a
curtain of civil improvement and citizenship, the very fact that this economic system
exists may be seen as what ties Europeans together. Indeed, as will be discussed in later
chapters, this idea of economic instrumentalism comes out in interviews with individuals
in the Basque region, particularly in light of the current (2007-2013) economic crisis.
Regardless, for those arguing that a European identity exists, there is evidence to
support the view that it might undercut traditional nationalisms. The European
Commission goes so far as to require states seeking accession to alter laws relating to
everything from labor protections to voter rights in order to meet Union-held ideals if
existing laws are seen as not being of high enough standard (European Commission
1993). In order to enjoy the economic benefits of EU membership – the main reason
many governments tout accession to their citizens – the EU requires acquiescence to its
own views of what constitutes minimal standards of civil and minority protections
(Tiersky, Jones, and Genugten 2011). For example, before the Romania and Bulgaria
were allowed to accede in 2007, they had to agree to and adopt legal changes to come in
line with the acquis communautaire, the body of European Union law composed of
legislation and court decisions. Accession negotiations also included a period of
monitoring by EU institutions which had to issue a final monitoring report confirming
compliance in 2006 (European Commission 2002). This report not only listed written
changes made to the legal code but also listed levels of implementation for problematic
areas. EU directives in the acquis relating to issues ranging from free movement of
people to the protection of languages – the latter example resulting in the adoption of
Cyrillic as a third official EU alphabet as part of Bulgaria’s accession. This all illustrates
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a tension in the EU that exists between the desire to elevate and respect diversity – very
much an ideal out of sync with “traditional” nationalism – and creating a sense of
“Europeanness”.
These many varied protections being offered as they are, the potential arises for
the EU to be seen as the protector of subnational identities, language groups, and
cultures, supporting them in what Urla (1988, 379) calls “the battle for cultural rights.”
This is of particular importance for subnational groups such as the Basques who assert
claims to national identity and effective sovereignty. It begins to be possible that regional
nationalists groups who see the state hierarchy as oppressive will champion the cause of
European integration and support its establishment over that of the state due to the
Union’s insistence on recognizing and respecting diversity. There is an ironic tension
here though because at the same time that the language of universalistic rights is being
used to foster and protect regional identities in their struggle for recognition from the
state, the Union also uses it to foist a program of “European” identity development on
citizens. The Union pushes a program of European Citizenship Education (ECE) which
can attempt to subvert more spatially circumscribed or limited senses of identity.
Regardless of this fact though, nationalists may see championing the European cause as a
positive action due to the insistence of European education initiatives that students learn
more than one language (Wringe 1996).
Moving on from discussions of national identity
From all of this discussion we arrive at three main points. First, the idea of a
national identity and sovereign national homeland is a modern phenomenon; the creation
of nationhood is a political project which seeks to orient itself as the dominant narrative
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in an imagined community. Nationalism is directly tied to a sense of sacredness and the
need to define territory. Sub-state nationalist and non-assimilationist undercut the
dominant nationalisms and act against the state’s interests when they pursue their own
nationalist agenda of resistance, establishing claims of autonomy, and territorial integrity.
Second, once a nation-state has been established, it is constantly reified through a sense
of banal nationalism as everyday experiences and articles become subconscious symbols
reinforcing nationalist claims. This is a two-edged sword though because just as these
things can subtly reinforce state power, they can also act in highly divided societies to
undercut it. Lastly, especially in the European context, there is an ongoing debate about
the development of post-national or European identities that seem to challenge the
traditional form of nation-building. While the structures that are put in place to do this
may weaken individual states and so be championed by sub-state nationalists, they may
also be dangerous to those regional goals as the supranational seeks to smooth competing
identities into a more general “European” concept.
2.2: LANGUAGE, LINGUISTIC POLICIES, AND EDUCATION
This section examines specifically the role of language in the process of nationbuilding and how it might complicate post-national citizenship. Building on the
modernist construction of nationalism, I will briefly examine the development of
language and its importance in discussions of identity. Following that, it is important to
cover the continued role of elites, specifically through the implementation of language
policies and how these policies are enacted in educational settings (schools) through
specific language education programs. Particular attention will be paid in this latter part
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to the idea of language education as a way to integrate youths into a wider national
framework.
Language is one of the major defining characteristics of “national culture”
(Hobsbawm 1996). In fact, it “is often considered the most powerful mark of identity”
(Kolossov 2003, 258). The rise of the modern nation-state is tied in with the rise of
common vernacular languages and with the rise of printing (Anderson 1991; Billig 1995).
Anderson’s “national-print languages” were vernaculars that arose out of uniform
spelling and grammar that began to appear as books, pamphlets, circulars, and other
printed materials began to be circulated. Prior to this, the language of the written word
was Latin, which was taught and even then only to the elites (Murphy 1981; Billig 1995).
The standardization of vernacular grammars and vocabularies came much later and rose
as an academic discipline alongside the creation of a national literary canon during the
Reformation and the development of the modern state in the eighteenth and into the
nineteenth centuries. According to Foucault (1979, 206), this parallel development of
structure in academia and society occurred in the context of a developing “disciplinary
society” that gave rise to the modern system we know today which instituted
standardized public schooling and the assimilation of regional languages. In this way,
regulating language became important for elites who wished to impose some form of
unified identity on a group.
Regulation of language
Anderson (as quoted in Oakes 2001, 20) states, “Language is not an instrument of
exclusion: in principle, anyone can learn any language. On the contrary, it is
fundamentally inclusive, limited only by the fatality of Babel: no one lives long enough
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to learn all languages.” This naïve theorizing about language ignores its incredible
capacity for exclusion. Vernacular languages were seen as a model for inclusion in new
nation-building projects but like much else with nationalism were often a two-edged
sword. The imposition of a vernacular requires the exclusion of other linguistic variations
and these exclusionary practices then create divisions within societies which can have
profound political consequences in a national arena.
Regulation of languages can assume many different forms and hierarchies ranging
from the classification of what counts as language down to the absolute right of usage.
There is great power in the ability to regulate official language and to exclude, denigrate,
and/or ban corrupted dialects. It is also linked to racialized struggles and class struggles.
In this way, Tuscan became the language of Italy while Piedmontese was demoted to the
status of a mere dialect (Petrosino 1992). Even more drastically, the Turkish government
maintains that there is no such thing as a Kurdish ethnicity of language, arguing that
Kurdish people are isolated “mountain Turks” who have either forgotten their native,
“Turkish” language or at best speak a corrupted version of it (Entessar 1989). Similarly
drastic were bans on Timorese education following the Indonesian invasion of East
Timor (Pilger 2010) and the nineteenth century bans on Welsh and Scots in the United
Kingdom (Kiernan 1993). All of these are examples of the dominant group asserting
linguistic dominance in the developing nation-state, giving further evidence of the
constructed nature of the supposed nation through subversion of other identities and
group traits. As Hobsbawm states, “Historically, the coexistence of peoples of different
languages and cultures is normal; or, rather, nothing is less common than countries
inhabited exclusively by people of a single uniform language and culture” (1996, 1068).
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The ability to classify language in this way facilitates the exclusion of those
groups who do not meet imposed standards even within the same language. Work by
Vassberg (1993) and Paltridge and Giles (1984) in France showed exclusionary attitudes
and practices within French conversation. Minority groups in these studies could be
delineated not only by speaking ‘foreign’ languages but by speaking a ‘regional accent’.
Paltridge and Giles in particular showed that there is not only a preferred accent in France
but that a hierarchy of preferred-to-less-preferred accents has developed.
When looking at the right of usage in discussing languages, we must examine the
totality of language rights allowed in a society. These range from the ability to conduct
government business in a certain language down to the legal allowance to even speak
certain languages on street corners. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, today Spain does
not – at least statutorily – have an issue with multilingualism. Rather, it is enshrined in
the national curriculum standards that students will learn a “foreign” language before
graduation. In addition, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 guarantees the protection of
regional languages and the right of all citizens to learn and speak them (Urla 1988; Urla
1993). Understanding this also illustrates the changing nature of nationalism and national
identity in the European context. Rather than being a monolithic, hegemonic force,
national identity can be understood today as a negotiated choice that is internalized in the
individual. Instead of being imposed from a above, it is a shifting ideal affected by a
variety of identity layers.
Hobsbawm argues against the idea that modern nation-states instituted central
language policies as a way to suppress competing “laterally bonded” identities of culture,
ethnicity, or language. “The ideal of [a state] represented by an ethnically, culturally, and
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linguistically homogeneous population…would have surprised the founders of the
original nation-states. For them, the unity of the nation was political and not socioanthropological. It consisted in the decision of a sovereign people to live under common
laws and a common constitution, irrespective of culture, language, and ethnic
composition” (1996, 1066). This statement adopts the position that – at least originally –
nation-states were to be formed with a sense of civic nationalism, ideals tied to
institutions or philosophies rather than demographic groupings. He builds on this idea by
further stating, “The original case for a standard language was entirely democratic, not
cultural. How could citizens understand, let alone take part in, the government of their
country if it was conducted in an incomprehensible language…Would this not guarantee
government by an elite minority?” (1996, 1069). This argument is problematic. It
assumes that centralized language policies enforcing a state-wide official tongue were an
idealistic attempt born out of respect for citizens and the desire to more easily
communicate with others. While there may have been a desire to more easily
communicate amongst various regions, it was no egalitarian movement driven by
optimistic democrats. Language policies may have been cloaked in this language but it
would have only been a cloak. As discussed in the last section, nationalist movements at
the state level in the nineteenth century were concerned with undercutting regional or
local identities for the sake of the centralized hierarchy. Furthermore, Hobsbawm seems
to ignore the fact that these language policies were often imposed by elites who chose to
hold their own language as the standard. Rather than implicitly creating an elite minority
by not educating the populace, these policies explicitly created marginalized languages –
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and thereby groups – on the periphery of the state by favoring one at the expense of
others.
Language education
Language education policies are emblematic of the regulatory practices which
began to be put in place by the hegemonic powers in nation-states at the start of the
modern era. On of the key sites of societal regulation was the emergence of public
schooling in the nineteenth century. Gellner (2009) directly ties the rise of the nationstate with this cultural transition which was itself tied to the imposition of a standardized
‘national tongue’, education of which was overseen by the central state power. This is
because “the educational system and the nation-state are strictly interdependent: one
cannot exist without the other”(Kolossov 2003, 258). Standardized education and
curriculum are then the markers of a centralized government. Similar to the way in which
the printed word relies upon and allows for the standardization of language, centralized
education systems help to standardize knowledge about state institutions and civic ideals.
However, the way in which language policies have been enacted, especially in the
educational arena, are not uniform. I have been discussing the way in which hegemonic
powers may seek to dominate/eliminate other linguistic identities. It must be noted that
this is not always the case. Especially in educational arenas, there can be a wide variance
in language policies and the way they are enacted in the school.
Taking all of this theoretical discussion of hegemonic language imposition into
account, governments have nonetheless enacted multi-layered language policies for a
variety of reasons. Nationalist education policies are typically concerned with
standardization efforts. However, and especially in the context of the European Union,
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elements at multilingualism appear. Though the historic reason for standardized
education might have been centralization of power, these new policies reflect new and
somewhat shifting ideals. These shifts again show the way in which national agendas are
shifting from monolithic impositions. Some changes allow for the advancement of ethnic
and national languages in an attempt to have disparate groups accept the governing
regime. However, others policies may admittedly still be an attempt to impose the
dominant language of the elites uniformly across the state’s territory, suppressing
competitors. Regardless, policies regarding language and language education were and
are instituted to further varying political agendas (Pavlenko 2008). In the European
Union today, these policies are at least on paper the result of a desire to promote diversity
and acknowledge regional differences. However, it must be noted that just because
education is allowed in the non-dominant language of the state, minority languages are
not necessarily any more privileged. That being said, “school-based linguistic
revitalization represents a potentially powerful transformative effort” for marginalized or
endangered languages (Brown 2012).
New agendas today can advance a variety of ideals – encouraging the
conceptualization of multiculturalism, simply respecting minority groups’ rights to speak
in their mother tongue, or attempting to reinforce the dominant group’s hegemony
through single-language school programs (Kymlicka 1995). In other cases, language
education is today being pushed in schools around the world as a method of increasing
capacity of citizens to interact in a global setting (Spring 2004). In idealized discourse of
the European Union, multilingual fluency is seen as a way to promote communication
and common understanding across the bloc. Citizens though often have a different
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perspective, attributing multilingual fluency to economic aspirations, a concept to be
explored later at greater depth in the case of the Basque region. Yet, multilingualism and
multilingual education is not uniformly lauded internationally. In some countries
multilingualism is seen as a positive attribute while in others it elicits controversy when
not speaking in the dominant or official language is portrayed as undermining a singular
and insularly focused, united nation (Pavlenko 2002; Pavlenko 2003). Even in states
which do not have an official language, multilingual education outside of the dominant
tongue can be controversial. This is illustrated in the United States by the dissention
caused by language accommodation programs advocated for by Spanish-speaking
Hispanic populations (Pogue 2003).
In examining the literature on language, three things become evident. First,
language can be a central part of establishing the hegemonic power of one national group
within the nation-state. In doing so, not only are other linguistic groups marginalized but
the dominant power formalizes its own language, imposing a structure and order that can
delineate and ostracize dialects. Second, this process is further evidence of and used in
the modernist construction of many national identities in Europe, an important point for
this case study. Third, language policies are often enacted in educational settings and can
advance a variety of civic ideals in today’s world. Whatever ideal being promoted –
multiculturalism, economic attractiveness, or even simple respect for cultural differences
– these policies are imposed from the state and function as an expression of the state
power. These educational policies target youth populations because it is the young people
who are required through truancy laws to attend schools. As we consider the relationship
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between nationalism and language policies, we must then focus specifically on the
relationship between these issues and young people’s budding sense of personal identity.
2.3 YOUTH POPULATIONS
At the core of this project an attempt to understand the relationship between
young people’s developing sense of national identity and language education policies in
the Basque region. The modernist construction of nationalism sees national identity as
constructed by elites and implemented in a top-down method. Of particular importance
national political projects are education and linguistic policies. Billig’s ideas of banal
nationalism in which everyday practices subconsciously affect and reify national identity
suggest that a sense of identity is not merely imposed from above but is a shifting
internalized process. Understanding this allows for one to examine how schools or other
social spaces serve as spaces in which nation-building projects and language policies
come together for young people. Young people, through their daily practices and
developing sense of identity, must negotiate various political projects as they shape their
sense of identity while coming of age in a democratic yet partially divided society. In this
way youth populations serve as a lens through which to examine these nationalist projects
from the bottom-up, evaluating the active choices individuals make when internalizing
national projects.
The potential for schools and educational policies to effect the development of
national identity in youths is enormous. Current research indicates that “children as
young as four years have nascent sense of nations and nationality, and even before
entering formal education many can already identify differences between ‘us’ and
‘them’” Hague (2001). Most of this early identification of nation and nationalities comes
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from interactions with familiar and easily remembered images and stereotypes imparted
by people – family, friends, schoolteachers – or media – television, film, posters.
(Wiegand 1992). Wiegand (1992) refers to these items as “emblem images”, and his
assertions about their role in forming early childhood conceptions of the nation reinforces
the important role of national symbols as described by Billig (1995), Hall (1996), and
Smith (2010). Some developmental psychologists disagree with the idea of early
childhood conceptions of nationalism, saying that spatial awareness develops only slowly
and with age (Piaget, Inhelder, and others 1956). Regardless of this, by the time youth
reach their teenage years, it is accepted that they are well on their way to shaping their
senses of identity and affiliation. As Sutton (2009) says, “even young children are able to
perceive and experience” social divisions and difference and this plays a large role in
forming how they perceive themselves and those around them.
However, children are not necessarily mere passive receptors of nationalist
ideology and practices. During the teenage years, youth fill a grey area between
childhood and adulthood. It is accepted that they have the ability to determine much of
their own social interaction and yet are constitutionally still excluded from many of the
privileges of citizenship (Weller 2003). This exclusion happens even in the face of
developing notions in Europe of children being portrayed as “fellow citizens” (Kjørholt
2007). They are in a position of informing their sense of belonging to the group while
having few political rights which they can exercise independent of supervisory control,
though as Nagel (2011, 121) points out, having a sense of belonging is “necessarily
political”. This sense of belonging and identity becomes more important because of the
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way that “social contingencies” frame the way they “construct…and feel ownership in
their construction” of their lives (Brannen and Nilsen 2002).
Because of their place in schools, language education policies are directed at
young people. This is implicitly stated because they are the target of such measures by
virtue of the fact that youths are the ones who actually sit in classrooms and receive
instruction each day. It thus becomes important to investigate how these young people
use language in their daily lives. Doing so allows us to evaluate how these young people
relate to competing identity discourses and potentially internalize (or not, as the case may
be) their message. Young people also serve as a new window through which the
complexities of nationalism and post-nationalism can be examined due to the fact that
affiliation with certain identities begins at a young age and occurs in some of the same
spaces as those held by adults espousing nationalist discourse. However, children and
youth experience these discourses in different ways than adults do (Leonard 2006a).
Understanding how youth populations in País Vasco are navigating these discourses
helps to understand the impact of language policies and the role that nationalist discourse
plays in youth identity formation. This in turn helps to evaluate the effectiveness of
nationalist policies in inculcating a sense of “being Basque” in future generations. The
idea of inculcation – that attitudes, ideas, or values, are instilled through persistent yet not
overbearing instruction – in schools again raises the specter of Billig’s banal nationalism.
The question is raised in what way this persistence in language instruction subtly
influences identity development or if it even does so at all?
Understanding this “effectiveness” is important because of the possibility that
youth may themselves “play” with various identities or discourses to the extent that they
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themselves subvert or even reject competing nationalisms. Youth agency seems to be
overlooked by nationalist projects which assume that hierarchical imposition will work to
instill ideals. Studying it allows us to see if there is this sense of a choice in young people
and how they negotiate internally and socially through such choice. Young people are
also important to study not only because they represent the future of a society but because
their stories are often eclipsed by adult narratives, particularly in societies riven by
sectarian or partisan divisions (Leonard 2006b). This subversion again ignores the fact
children have agency in national struggles (Habashi 2011). Ignoring this process means
that we ignore providing additional depth to our understanding of national projects.
In light of this literature, as well as that on language policies and the idea of postnational identity in Europe, we are faced with the fact that youth have choices. As
previously stated, various policies such as language education target them, but this does
not necessarily mean it impacts them the way nationalists would hope. Chapter 5
discusses this concept and what it potentially means for the cause of nationalism and
national movements in Europe.
2.4 MOVING OUT OF THE LITERATURE
The youth of País Vasco are faced with a society in which there are active efforts
to create and impose national projects. Language education policies play a major role in
this. They must negotiate transforming their early childhood “emblem images” of nation
into a coherent sense of identity while in a complex social setting that presents competing
ideas on the subject to them from the earliest age. Faced with strident views from both
the ardent, centralizing Spanish nationalist and the equally fervent, regional-based
Basque nationalists, there is simultaneously a supranational entity in the form of the
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European Union pushing for a sense of a unified European identity. From this literary and
analytical foundation I will address issues of how different nation-building projects
become meaningful to young people in the region and how schools or other social spaces
serve as spaces in which nation-building projects and language policies come together for
young people. This discussion will incorporate data collected from on-site interviews in
the city of Bilbao, Spain. Before moving immediately into discussion and analysis of the
empirical data, I will briefly describe in the next chapter the process of field work and the
methods employed in this project.
.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
For this research I used a series of semi-structured interviews with parents,
teachers, and secondary school students to elicit information about the ways they
perceive and discuss issues of national identity, language education and daily language
usage, and to ascertain the political significance of linguistic choices in País Vasco.
Through these interviews I was able to elicit in-depth information from informants that
provided “rich descriptions of complex phenomena” (Sofaer 1999, 1101). Rather than
supplying potentially simplistic or limited responses that would come with methods such
as surveying, interviews allowed me not only to receive more in-depth information
immediately, but also flesh out deeper meanings and intents behind the comments made
by informants. Given the complex nature of identity and associated daily choices such as
language usage, the combined flexibility and depth of interviews provided a valuable data
gathering tool. These interviews were supplemented by personal observation of specific
areas of the city mentioned by informants as well as separate social excursions with
student informants in order to provide firsthand context to gathered information.
Secondary data collection of policy documents and general demographic information
from EU institutions, the Spanish government, and the regional government of País
Vasco also occurred. This chapter discusses the design and implementation of this
fieldwork and the reasoning behind the methodology used.
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3.1: RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS AND INTERVIEWS
Prior to beginning fieldwork, I made initial contact with individuals at the Centro
Internacional de Español (CIDE) at the University of Deusto in Bilbao. I had previously
studied at Deusto during my undergraduate career through a program administered by
CIDE. Using this personal connection, I solicited contact information for teachers to
serve as initial contacts in school settings. I also made contact with professors who might
allow me to make brief presentations to their classes at Deusto in order to solicit student
informants. Of the initial four teacher contacts I made, two declined to participate in the
study following my arrival on site. Of the other two, one allowed me to conduct a
personal interview while the other assisted me in “snowballing” other contacts, both
teachers and parents. I also used snowball sampling to contact additional potential student
informants following initial solicitation in classrooms. Snowballing was used in large part
because of its ability to “make use of natural social networks” in the study population
(Noy 2008, 329). This not only allowed me to more easily approach potential informants,
but because of the personal introductions also allowed for less stilted conversation from
the beginning. This lessening of introductory formality makes it easier for informants to
both trust the researcher and open up sooner and more fully in their responses. In order to
limit the potential of my snowballing method to reproduce similarities in respondents, I
sought out contacts with people who did not exactly replicate the same characteristics as
other informants. For example, I asked for contacts with students from different high
school language models while also balancing participants’ current post-secondary
enrollment across both of the major universities in Bilbao.
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I received Institutional Review Board approval from the University of South Carolina
prior to meeting any potential informants in person. I specifically designed my project to
protect the identities and confidentiality of my informants. Confidentiality was essential
because potential issues discussed included those of political or ideological nature that
could be controversial in the city and region. Conversations about Basque nationalism
and support for nationalists can inevitably bring up issues regarding historical oppression,
longstanding resentment, and feelings of marginalization. They can also touch on issues
related to banned ultranationalist movements and groups deemed terrorists by the
governments of Spain, the EU, and the United States. While these issues were not the
central focus of my study, I nonetheless had to take them into consideration when
designing my protocol. For these reasons I assured all of my informants of confidentiality
when first meeting with them. Upon sitting down with each person, I presented with an
informational letter inviting them to take part in my work, explaining the aims of the
research, and explaining anonymity and confidentiality. Every informant was guaranteed
verbally and in writing that I would use pseudonyms and would remove potentially
identifying information from transcripts and final works. I emphasized the voluntary
nature of this project and that I would not reveal sensitive information or illegal activities
in my commentary. The on-site fieldwork for this project occurred over a period of seven
weeks in the fall semester of 2012. During this time I conducted twenty-four semistructured interviews with students, teachers, and parents, each group of which is
described here in turn.
I met with nineteen students, speaking with ten individually, six of them in pairs, and one
trio (see Table 2.1). For reasons relating to the sensitivities previously mentioned, as well
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as to simplify the research process, I limited my contact to students who had reached the
age of majority, which throughout Spain is eighteen. The students I interviewed ranged in
age from 18 to 23. The majority of these students fell in the 18-20 age range, though 5 of
them ranged from 21-23. I attempted to speak with University students in this younger
age band so as to garner feedback from individuals as closely located to high school
leaving age as possible. This had a dual advantage. First students closer to this age are
likely to remember their earlier education more vividly with all of the attendant emotions
and attitudes. Second, concentrating on the lower age band focused interviews on
students who were most recently beginning to negotiate the rights associated with coming
of age such as democratic participation and voting. This is important because this is the
point at which young people are able to assert societal membership and develop a sense
of political consciousness and belonging. All of the students I interviewed attended either
the University of Deusto or the University of País Vasco (UPV). Deusto is a private
university sited near the city center while UPV is the Vizcayan branch of the País Vasco
public university system. Student interviews were semi-structured in nature and asked
participants to reflect on their secondary school experiences after (generally) one to three
years distance. A few main questions helped guide the course of the discussion I had with
each participant, but I allowed for flexibility in the conversation so that particularly
interesting points or tangents could be explored more fully as needed.
Table 2.1: Student informants
Code Pseudonym

Age

Gender

S1
S2
S3
S4
S5

22
22
21
18
19

F
F
F
F
M

Udane
June
Irati
Nahia
Iker

Interview
University
Session
Deusto
IS1
Deusto
Deusto
Deusto
IS2
Deusto
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School
Type
Ikastola
Ikastola
Ikastola
D
D

S6
S7
S8
S9
S10
S11
S12
S13
S14
S15
S16
S17
S18
S19

Oier
Unai
Markel
Uxue
Adere
Naroa
Leire
Jon
Ander
Mikel
Eneko
Paula
Aiala
Nora

18
20
18
19
21
20
20
19
20
23
19
19
20
20

M
M
M
F
F
F
F
M
M
M
M
F
F
F

IS3
IS4
IS5
IS6
IS7
IS8
IS9
IS10
IS11
IS12
IS13
IS14

Deusto
Deusto
UPV
UPV
Deusto
Deusto
Deusto
Deusto
Deusto
UPV
UPV
UPV
UPV
UPV

D
B
A
D
Ikastola
D
D
B
B
A
A
D
D
B

Seven teachers participated in interviews with me, five of them individually and two as a
pair (see Table 2.2). All together they represented five different schools in Bilbao and its
surrounding environs. I was also unable to have direct access to classroom observation in
schools associated with my teacher informants because of bureaucratic processes that
were unresolved by the point that I was to return to the United States. However, my
informants did agree to meet with me elsewhere and talk about their daily work
experience. Two of these teachers came from the private ikastola system while the other
five worked in public schools. Four of these public teachers work in D-model schools
emphasizing Euskara education while the other teacher works in an A-model school. The
fact that I did not interview a teacher working in a B-model school is primarily a
shortcoming of the snowball strategy of informant contact as well as the limited amount
of time that I was in the field. In this way my work, especially with teachers, cannot be
said to be representative of all facets of Basque education but it nonetheless provides
insight into the work teachers do and the attitudes they display in the classroom on a daily
basis. As with students, teacher interviews were semi-structured. A few main questions
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helped guide the course of the discussion I had with each participant, but flexibility
abounded. Generally these questions were fairly similar to those asked of students but
were approached from a slightly different perspective.
Table 2.2: Teacher informants
Code Pseudonym

Gender

T1
T2
T3
T4
T5
T6
T7

F
F
F
M
F
F
M

Maialen
Ainhoa
Juana
Aimar
Agirre
Izaro
Carlos

Interview School
Session
Type
D
IT1
D
IT2
ikastola
IT3
A
IT4
D
IT5
ikastola
IT6
D

I was also able to interview five parents (see Table 2.3). Of these, one interview
was with a mother-father pair while three other mothers spoke to me individually. All but
one of the parents interviewed were contacted through their children that were also
research participants. I took care to interview each parent away from his/her
son/daughter. This allowed me to elicit different viewpoints from each type of informant
without the pressure or influence of the other being present in the room. I also
interviewed one mother who had no children participating in my project. However, of her
three children, one is currently in high school. Contact with this mother was made
through a teacher in her child’s school whom I had already interviewed. Parental
interviews tended to be the shortest of all interviews and therefore had a correspondingly
shorter list of questions to guide the interview.
Table 2.3 Parent informants
# of
Cod
Pseudonym Childre
e
n
P1
Xabi
2
P2
Lucía

Gende Interview Associated
r
Session
Student
M
F
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IP1

S12 Leire

P3
P4
P5

Begoña
Itziar
Ane

3
2
3

F
F
F

IP2
IP3
IP4

S16 Eneko
S18 Nora

All but three of these interviews were conducted in a majority of English with
Spanish asides made as needed to clarify questions for participants or answers for the
interviewer. As the interviewer, I am conversant in Spanish and comfortable speaking in
the language as I studied in as part of my undergraduate program of study. Furthermore, I
underwent language remediation and training during the summer prior to field work to
solidify comfort with Castilian. The offer was made to all participants to conduct the
interview in either English or Castilian. Those participants who spoke in English did so
because they were all at least conversational in the language and stated that they felt
comfortable using it. Of the interviews conducted in Spanish, one was with a student
(S16 – Eneko) who admitted that his grasp of English was faulty and would be a
hindrance to the process. The other two interviews were with parents (P3 – Begoña and
P4 – Itziar) who knew only random phrases at best in English. Incidentally, one of these
parents was also the mother of the student needing an interview in Spanish. These three
interviews were assisted by a university student studying linguistics who served as
needed as a translator. Recommended by professorial contacts, she was certified as being
fully fluent in Castilian, Euskara, and English, as well as conversational in French.
Additional information including statistical and demographic data regarding language
usage, fluency, and education was collected from publicly accessible government
databases. This information included the levels of fluency in Euskara and Castilian over
time and the number of children enrolled in each school model. The primary source for
this information was the Basque Department of Education, Language Policy, and Culture.
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I also supplemented my interview data with limited participant observation and informal
surveys of neighborhoods and areas mentioned to me in interviews. I was able to watch
participants interact with others around them as well as explore the visual and auditory
cues constantly swirling around them in the city. Observation centered on traveling
through the city with informants as well as going on three separate evening social
excursions with student informants. This direct observation of participants was limited by
the amount of time I was able to spend in Bilbao. My informal surveys of neighborhoods
and city districts consisted of walking “tours” I took each day. These personal
observations were intended to both provide context to interview information as well as
help me generate more nuanced questions for participants. In addition to these informal
observations, I was able to attend two separate mass rallies while in Bilbao. Though these
were related to rising unemployment and other economic woes in Spain, they also helped
provide additional context for information that came up in several interviews. As will be
discussed in a later chapter, this knowledge of the wider economic issues swirling in
Spain is necessary in order to properly couch interview data in the proper temporal
context.
3.2: ANALYSIS
Using a series of semi-structured interviews with students, teachers, and parents, I
was able to elicit information from each group with a slightly different perspective. This
information covered a variety of interrelated topics such as school choice, school policies,
interactions between each of the three groups, and daily usage of language and the social
negotiations that accompany it. I supplemented information from interviews with
personal observations in the city of Bilbao in order to provide a deeper layering of
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context to the information I gathered. From all of this I was able to garner a large amount
of information regarding language usage, education, and identity development in youth
populations.
I transcribed each of the interview sessions upon the end of my field work. Using
basic word processing software, I typed out each conversation, anonymizing each
participant’s information as I went. Following this, I took printed transcripts and began to
code them, searching for key themes, phrases or ideas that stood out. I also took part of
this time to go through my own field notes and organize observational data on the basis
of date and theme. As I began to discern general trends in the information before me, I
also began to compare how different groups’ data compared with each other – teachers,
parents, and students all against each other as well as between different school models.
While developing these themes I also made note to find particularly relevant excerpts that
could be quoted here to provide context and examples of the argument I make.
It needs to be noted that there are limitations to this data. The informants for this
project characterize a limited subset of the people in Bilbao and País Vasco and are not
empirically representative of the entire population. The students in particular come from
a fairly homogeneous middle-class socio-economic background and all are in process of
becoming highly educated. Furthermore, all but three of my informants were not only
fluent in both Castilian and Euskara but also spoke English with a high degree of fluency.
Some were even conversational in additional languages. This then presented little
representation of the social and educational diversity present in Bilbao. However, this
sample is nonetheless helpful in illustrating the complexities of competing identities,
language usage, and the lack of a straightforward relationship between educational goals

41

and youth identities. Even within the relatively homogenous sample provided here, there
is a wide disparity in perceptions, actions, and reasonings. It is also an interesting sample
to examine because these individuals represent the highly educated, multilingual citizens
that academic tracks in the Basque education system seek to mold. Rather than showing
homogeneity in thought, these informants illustrate how even individuals who on paper
meet similar socio-economic and educational criteria come to differing conclusions when
wrestling with these issues. This status as model students is also useful when examining
the issues of identity from the European level because they also represent the
multilingual, well-educated European citizens that Brussels’ policies seek to encourage.
Because of these reasons, the apparent homogeneity of informants is not necessarily
harmful to this project even though it must be acknowledged including the potential
limiting aspects of it.
This data will be discussed at greater length in Chapter IV. However, before that and to
place the accompanying analysis within its proper context for the reader, the next chapter
will briefly discuss the history of the Basque people and nationalist movements, the
development of Euskara, and the development and current status of the education system
in País Vasco.
3.3 TERMINOLOGY
As is discussed repeatedly throughout this thesis, issues surrounding language can
be much politicized in the Basque areas of Spain. Even the terminology used in a project
like mine can relay implicit meanings, however unintentional they may be. For this
reason I must be explicit that the non-English terminology I use – except where included
in direct quotes from informants – is chosen for the sake of internal clarity, consistency,

42

and delineation. The intent on my part is not political. For example, since even the names
of languages themselves can be contentious, I choose to refer to them by their regional
names solely for the purpose of differentiation. In this way, “Spanish” as we know it in
the United States is termed Castilian (sometimes referred to as castellano by informants)
while the Basque language is termed Euskara. In the latter case this also has the easy
benefit of differentiating between the Basque language and the Basque people in that the
unqualified “Basque” will refer only to the people group.
Other terminology choices are slightly more capricious but tend to favor Castilian
terms simply because of my own familiarity with the language. For example, the
Autonomous Community in which the city of Bilbao is referred to here as País Vasco
simply because that is how I was first introduced to it. I similarly use the Castilian names
for cities and provinces because they are the terms most likely to be familiar to the
American audience. In the case of discussing the type of school with which individuals
are affiliated, I use the standard descriptors of A- and B-models. However, while the
terms “D-model” and “ikastola” are oftentimes colloquially interchangeable in Bilbao, I
differentiate between the two terms. D-model in the context of this project specifically
refers to public schools that use the Euskara-dominant curriculum while ikastola refers to
those private schools operated on D-model lines. More distinct differences between the
two systems are in Chapter 3..
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CHAPTER 4
BACKGROUND CONTEXT
In order to discuss the identities of young people in País Vasco and the
role of the education system in shaping these identities through language curricula, it is
first necessary to ground this project in historical context. This chapter grounds this
discussion in the history of the Basque nationalism and the relationship between the
Basques and the modern Spanish state, as well as the European Union. Particular
attention will be paid to the modern history of nationalist movements in the region. This
historically recent development of Basque national identity and nationalist separatist
movements reflects the modernist viewpoint discussed in Chapter I. The second section
features a short discussion of the development of Euskara as a language and the
modernization and standardization it has undergone in the last century. It also covers the
formalization of the education system in País Vasco along its current three-track system
in which school enrollment is predicated on placing students in one of three language
models. The system of private ikastola schools is also discussed. Taken all together, this
chapter illustrates the way in which Basque nationalism and nationalist policies have
been shaped by the relationship with the Spanish state and the historic back-and-forth
transitions between centralization and decentralization.
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4.1: HISTORY OF THE BASQUE PEOPLE AND NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS
The region inhabited by “Basque people” skirts the coastal regions of northern
Spain and southern France on the edge of the Bay of Biscay (see Figure 4.1). The
traditional territory forming Euskal Herria, roughly translated as “Basque Country”, is
split into seven provinces, four in Spain and three in France (Heiberg 2007). Within
Spain, four provinces are split between two Autonomous Communities, the first-level
political division in that country. The first Community, País Vasco/Euskadi, is made up
of the provinces of Álava/Araba, Vizcaya/Bizkaia, and Guipúzcoa/Gipuzkoa. The second
Community, Navarra/Nafarroa, is a uni-provincial entity named after the historic region
over which it is delineated. Located in France, the three northern provinces – BasseNavarre/Nafarroa Beherea, Labourd/Lapurdi), and Soule/Zuberoa – form the western part
of the French department of Pyrénées-Atlantiques. Though historically part of the greater
region, they were gradually and formally split from their Spanish counterparts by the
French-Spanish border as dynastic successions and various wars formalized that
boundary throughout the Middle Ages and the early modern period. These three French
provinces feature prominently in nationalist-separatist imagery espousing the unification
of the entire historic region as a single, independent political entity, but otherwise have
little bearing on this project.
Linguistically, the Basque people are identified with Euskara, a singularly unique
tongue. A language isolate, it is unrelated to any other language in the world. Theories as
to its age and origins proliferate in linguistic studies. It is possibly the oldest language
spoken in Europe. Origin theories posited over the last few centuries include everything
from Basque people being one of the Lost Ten Tribes of Israel to their being descendants
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of Neanderthals. Less sensational theories have suggested that Euskara, and the Basques
themselves, could be related to other semi-isolate groups in Europe such as the FinnoUgric languages of Finnish, Hungarian, and Estonian. The most recent theory to emerge
about Euskara’s origins was published in early 2013 by Spanish academic Jaime Martín
(Ediciones 2013) suggests that it is closely related to the Dogon tribal language of
northen Mali. However, most linguists maintain that Euskara does in fact represent a
language group predating the development of Indo-European languages into Western
Europe, of which all other branches have been extinct for the length of recorded history
(Kurlansky 2001). This uniqueness then, and the language’s perceived longevity, helps
make it the leading marker for Basque culture and identity.

Figure 4.1: Basque provinces in Spain and France
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The first written historical reference we have of the people inhabiting the Basque
reigon is from the Roman historian Strabo who referred to them as Vascones (Heiberg
2007). Before this time, there was no central authority in the region, nor was there a
standardized Basque language such as we consider Euskara to be today. Rather, varying
tribes and villages spread throughout mountains and valleys speaking wide array of
related dialects. While inland tribes were mostly small farmers and herders, settlements
along the coast were well-established communities engaged in extensive maritime
commerce. Archeological finds provide evidence of ocean-going vessels capable of
sailing not only along the Biscayan coast but also southward around the Iberian Peninsula
and into the Mediterranean and northward as far as the North Sea. Indeed, there is some
evidence to suggest that Basque fisherman were by this time already harvesting cod off
the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, though records of such activity do not exist until the
fifteenth century (Collins 1990). Roman armies reached the region under Pompey in the
first century BCE. The Romans arranged the Basque tribes’ recognition of Roman
suzerainty in return for regional semi-autonomy in which free movement of troops and
goods was allowed through their land. This level of relative autonomy mirrored later,
similar methods of regional governance and helped create a myth of an unconquered
people (Mansvelt-Beck 2005). Basque provinces were not subject to the Roman legal
code but instead were able to govern using their own traditional laws (Collins 1990).
Later centuries featured the Basque provinces sitting astride the boundary of
warring Visigoth and Frankish empires, conversion to Christianity, and helping to repel
Moorish invasions of the Peninsula (Kurlansky 2001). The later medieval period also
witnessed the emergence of history’s only Basque-dominated independent state in the
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form of the Kingdom of Navarra (Heiberg 2007). The year 1179 marked the annexation
of the region to the medieval kingdom of Castilla (Heiberg 2007). This is historically
extremely important for two reasons. First, the region that is today País Vasco was
subdivided into the three provinces of Álava, Vizcaya, and Guipúzcoa (Kurlansky 2001).
However, and second, the region was granted wide-ranging autonomy under Castilian
rule, with the right to continue governance under the fueros – roughly translated as
Charters or traditional laws – which the Castilian king swore to honor. This practice
would continue consistently through state and dynastic changes until the mid-nineteenth
century, and the abolishment of the fueros would be a major spark in early development
of Basque nationalist movements (Kurlansky 2001; Heiberg 2007).
In 1492, Ferdinand of Aragón and Isabella of Castilla completed the Reconquista
of Spain. Marrying in 1469, they united the crowns of the two kingdoms and so brought
into being the formation of the modern Kingdom of Spain. Isabella brought with her
territory the western part of the Iberian Basque region that is today País Vasco, and
following her death in 1512 Ferdinand invaded the eastern half, the remnants of the
Kingdom of Navarra. Fighting off Navarrese attempts from the northern side of the
Pyrenees to regain their territory, the totality of what is now Spanish Basque country was
united under one crown with the rest of modern Spain (Collins 1990; Heiberg 2007;
Kurlansky 2001). Following the unification of Spain, the Basque regions were still
granted the right to their fueros, but other symbols of autonomy were spasmodically
granted and taken away.
Following Spanish unification, individual cities in the region became trade and
transportation hubs, particularly Bilbao. This provided economic stability amidst the
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inflation in Spain caused by the influx of gold from the New World (Kurlansky 2001).
During the Napoleonic Wars, many in the region joined forces with the British Army as it
marched north into France as part of the peninsular campaign. Following the restoration
of the Spanish monarchy after the Napoleonic wars, Ferdinand VII revoked liberal
reforms put in place during his exile. The resulting civil war and later Carlist Wars over
succession led to a spiral of destabilization in Spain (Kurlansky 2001; Heiberg 2007). In
1873, the First Spanish Republic was proclaimed but dissolved in a little less than two
years. Following this, Madrid attempted to centralize control of the country and the
fueros were formally abolished in 1876, spawning discontent that would begin to
coalesce around the burgeoning notions of Basque nationalism (Facaros and Pauls 2008;
Atienza 2006). At the same time, rapid industrialization in Vizcaya fueled a demand for
workers and outside groups began to immigrate to the Basque regions (Heiberg 2007).
During the late nineteenth century Basque nationalists gained formal strcture with the
founding of the first nationalist political party, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Heiberg
2007; Atienza 2006).
In 1933, the monarchy was once again formally abolished and the Second Spanish
Republic was declared (Watson 2008). Socialist-leaning Republicans adopted a strategy
of regional appeasement and autonomy that granted special status to the Basque regions,
as well of those of Catalonia and Galicia (Shafir 1995). After only three year, the Spanish
Civil War broke out as Francisco Franco fought against the Republic. The Civil War
complicated issues of Basque unity and identity expression as the provinces of Vizcaya
and Guipuzkoa sided with the Republican forces while Araba and Navarra cast their lots
with Franco (Kurlansky 2001). Both during the war and immediately following it, those
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Basque areas which sided against Franco’s Nationalist forces were subjected to political
and cultural oppression from the right-wing movement. With his eventual selection as
Generalísimo of the Nationalist armies, Franco was also able to succeed as head of state
following the death of Emilio Mola in 1937 (Clark 1979). From the outset of Franco’s
time in power, there was a violent backlash against him. Initially this was seen in the
form of the Spanish maquis, Republican soldiers who took to the mountains of northern
Spain and waged irregular combat with Nationalist soldiers until the early 1950’s. The
backlash against the Francoist government coincided with the maturation of factions in
the Basque nationalist movement embracing violence, even terrorism, as a legitimate
form of resistance. This was particularly true those advocating for complete secession
from the Spanish state (Watson 2008). Though not all Basques nationalist groups
embraced calls for independence, Francoist oppression increased sympathy the
secessionist movement.
Organized and armed nationalist resistance to the Franco regime in the Basque
region came in the form of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom,
ETA) in 1952 (Watson 2008). Created initially as a student discussion group at the
University of Deusto in Bilbao, the group was reconstituted as ETA in 1959 (Clark
1990). By the time of ETA’s founding, many nationalists were not calling for mere
autonomy but actual separation from Spain. In addition, they promoted the mutilation of
“Spanish” symbols displayed in public such as the flag of El Estado España – the
Spanish State – and the national coat of arms that had been created by Franco. Members
also began to distribute and clandestinely to hang the Ikurriña, the flag of Basque
nationalism, in public places and to graffiti historic Basque emblems throughout major
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cities (Hualde, Lakarra, and Trask 1995). There was also a clandestine movement to
preserve Euskara communication since part of Franco’s “One Spain” policy was to
suppress regional languages in the face of the “true” Spanish language, Castilian (Watson
2008). Direct violence against individuals began in 1968 (Clark 1990). The resulting
arrests and executions of ETA members were used by hardline Basque nationalists as
justification for further attacks including the 1973 bombing that claimed the life of
Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s Prime Minister and presumed successor (Forest
1975). By targeting such an important and entrenched member of the regime, the goal of
the attack was to induce “a spiral of violence” that would destabilize Spain and increase
Franco’s oppressive policies toward the Basque people. This would in turn push the
average person to pursue independence as the lesser of two evils when compared with the
Francoist regime (Juaristi 2000). Ultimately this did not occur, but it did ensure the
accession of Juan Carlos I to the throne of Spain from which he pushed for democratic
reform.
Following Franco’s death in 1975, the Spanish government began a slow
transition away from totalitarianism to a democratically elected representative
government (Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010). A draft Constitution was then approved
by the Spanish Cortes in October 1978, and by the Spanish citizenry on December 6,
1978. It went into effect December 29 of that same year (Mansvelt-Beck 2005). One of
the core pillars of this new document was the creation and recognition of Autonomous
Communities. Section 2 of the Preliminary Title of the Constitution states, “The
Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and
indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-
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government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity
among them all” (emphasis added). Thereafter, in Section 1 of Article 143, it reads, “In
the exercise of the right to self-government recognized in Article 2 of the Constitution,
bordering provinces with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics, island
territories and provinces with historic regional status may accede to self-government and
form Autonomous Communities in conformity with the provisions contained in this Title
and in the respective Statutes.” This meant that the new Autonomous Community of País
Vasco was quickly formed by its three constituent regions of Álava, Vizcaya, and
Guipúzcoa. País Vasco has been able to gain the greatest deal of autonomy of any
Community within the wider Spanish state (Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010). Navarra
stayed a separate Community based on an “update and improvement” of its traditional
fueros, which had managed to survive even the machinations of the Francoist regime due
to support for Nationalist forces during the Civil War (Clark 1979).
The Statute of Autonomy granted to País Vasco came quickly after the
promulgation of the Constitution, partly in an effort to diffuse secessionists (Clark 1990).
However, ETA attacks were actually at their highest levels in terms of casualties and the
group was slowly but surely becoming more radicalized during the 1980s. Coinciding
with this was the revelation that the paramilitary Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación
(GAL), had begun to kidnap, torture, and kill ETA members, as well as those possibly
related to or supporting them (Woodworth 2001). GAL was responsible for 28 known
murders between 1983 and 1987, with several others tied to them. The scandal that
erupted in the early 1990’s when GAL was found to have state ties further radicalized
ETA and bred distrust of the central government. While sympathy for the organization
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began to rise, moderate nationalists still dominated the political scene. Herri Batasuna,
ETA’s political wing, enjoyed significant minority support in the region even though it
was the only Basque political party not to sign a 1988 pact supporting the end of ETA
violence (Bew, Frampton, and Gurruchaga 2009).
Nationalist parties have played a decisive role in the make-up of the regional
assembly and the composition of coalition governments. So strong have they been that
every government in País Vasco formed from 1980 until the 2009 election was
dominated by a PNV executive. While moderate nationalists during this time came to
accept the status quo of far-reaching regional autonomy, hardliners continued to maintain
that the Basque people were the only people with the right to make decisions about the
future of the region. They also demanded that all members past and present of ETA be
granted amnesty, and called for respect “for the results of the democratic process in the
Basque Country” with regards to independence referenda (Bew, Frampton, and
Gurruchaga 2009).
In 2001the Lehendakari (President of País Vasco) Juan José Ibarretxe offered up a
plan to increase devolution of power to the Basque government, to separate the Basque
judicial system from the greater Spanish one, and to strip of the central government’s
right to suspend the regional government’s power. This plan was shot down by a 29-3132 margin in the Spanish Cortes. Similarly, a 2008 referendum asking voters if they
supported “that the Basque parties, without exceptions, start a process of negotiation to
reach a democratic agreement about the right to decide of the Basque People”, was
suppressed by the Spanish Constitutional Court. Since this brief resurgence of mainline
calls for greater independence, however, the politics of nationalist parties have for the
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most part returned to their traditional moderate stances. Meanwhile, the Spanish
Constitutional Court banned hardline parties affiliated with ETA beginning in
2002(Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010). Organizations that the Spanish courts have
determined to merely be reconstituted forms of the original groups under new names
have subsequently been banned as well. In September 2010 ETA declared a ceasefire,
further stating in January 2011 that it is “permanent”, formally renouncing violence in
late 2012. Though not admitted by the group, the general consensus is that the reason
behind this capitulation has been the increased pressure placed on it in recent years with
the continual turnaround in leadership due to arrests.
4.2: DEVELOPMENT OF EUSKARA AND LANGUAGE EDUCATION TODAY
As previously mentioned, Euskara as a language is seen as the marker which
defines being Basque. Though Basque people are sometimes described as slightly shorter
with a swarthy complexion and darker hair than the stereotypical image of someone from
Spain, visual or physiological differences are not really what defines “being Basque”.
Rather it is the shared heritage of a culture and region that is marked by a unique
language. This is of particular note because while there have been historic descriptions of
the “Basque tongue”, Euskara has not been a unified language until the last few decades.
Historically there have been up to anywhere from six to nine historic dialects recognized
and even today there are five main dialects (Zuazo 2010). These modern divisions arose
in the Middle Ages due to separation of various administrative regions as previously
mentioned (Elissalt 1981; Zuazo 2010). This multi-faceted language is made more
complex by the fact that these can subdivided into eleven sub-dialects which can
themselves be subdivided into twenty-four minor varieties. This becomes problematic for
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a nationalist movement identified by language. Though all of these sub-dialects and
minor varieties are indeed in the same family, they can be mutually unintelligible.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, as the Basque national movements
gained momentum, there were calls to preserve and standardize the language of Euskara
(Zalbide n.d.). A language instate called the Euskaltzaindia was established in 1918 to
oversee language development and conventions. Later given royal patronage, it is a Royal
Academy on par with that for Castilian, the Real Academia Española. Over the next two
decades, literary works – both fiction and nonfiction – in Euskara began to flourish.
However, this production ceased almost completely and abruptly with the end of the Civil
War (Gardner 2008). The Franco regime suppressed the language as it did not meet his
ideals of a unified Spain, though this suppression was not uniformly enforced. The
provinces of Vizcaya and Guipukoa were targeted more heavily than Navarra or Araba
since they had fought against Franco. However, Araba and Navarra also had smaller
Euskara speaking populations and so the process was not as disruptive. Indeed, even
today Araba has the smallest Euskara speaking population per capita of all of the historic
Basque provinces. Following the return to democracy though, suppression was halted and
Euskara was given legal protection and co-official status in País Vasco. The 1979 Statute
of Autonomy granted wide-ranging powers and protections to Euskara and movement
towards extensive language education programs was begun(Gardner 2008). Prior to this,
in 1976, the Euskaltzaindia had commissioned a wide-ranging report on the situation of
Euskara. That report’s information on the status of the language, and one chapter in
particular on the preparedness of teachers to instruct in it, was extremely influential in the
structuring of the education system.
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Because of existence of multiple dialects throughout the region, standardization
efforts begun in the early twentieth century were continued under government
sponsorship in order to create an “official” dialect. This movement culminated in
“Euskara Batua” or Standardized Euskara. Based heavily on Guipukoan – in large part
because this province had the highest concentration of Euskara fluency – with influences
from other regional dialects, this is the Euskara form used in official mediums –
education, government documents, signage, etc. However, there were many emotional
debates surrounding standardization. Urla (1993) chronicles these debates, especially as
they concern the question of modernity. Cited by Urla, the Basque philosopher Miguel de
Unamuno (1864-1936) had argued that Euskara was a primitive language and that it
constituted “a grave obstacle to the spread of European culture in [our] country” (1993,
105). He and other academics argued that Euskara was too primitive and had too long
been isolated from the languages of science, business, and culture to be relevant in the
modern age. In fact, they went so far as to argue for the continued dominance of
Castilian. However, preservationists ultimately won out, Batua became formalized, and
the new Basque government began to construct the three-model education system we see
today.
País Vasco is officially bilingual, and the education system in the region reflects
this by instituting three different tracks or models of schools. A-model is a Castilian
model in which Euskara language and literature is also a compulsory subject. B-model is
a dual-language mixed system in which primary instruction occurs in both languages
based on the classroom and subject. Finally, D-model is Euskara dominant with Castilian
language and literature as a compulsory subject(Aldekoa and Gardner 2002; Gardner and
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Zalbide 2005; Gardner 2002a; Gardner 2002b). Parents in the region have the absolute
right to determine which school model their children enter and the primary language used
in their education. “Models A and B were originally intended for children from Spanishspeaking homes, while D was for children from Basque-speaking homes. Model D,
however, was from the start also popular with Spanish-speaking parents” (Gardner
2002b, 7). There is not widespread agreement in the literature as to why parents
necessarily pick the school model that they do; however, this will be discussed in the
following chapter in light of my research findings. Aldekoa and Gardner (2002) and
Gardner (2002b) do however show that the number of children enrolled in D-model, and
B-model to an extent, have increased in the last three decades while the number in Amodel has shrunk. Gardner (2002b) posits that this is because as parents came to see Dmodel and/or bilingual instruction as “stable” with enough teachers competent in the
language and immersion instruction as a valuable experience.
In addition to the public school system, there is also a variety of private schools in
País Vasco. It must be noted that these schools, while private, still receive state support in
the form of per-student monetary grants. However, parents do still pay fees of varying
sizes for their children’s enrollment. These private schools fall into two main camps:
religious schools and ikastolas. Religious schools are typically operated by the Roman
Catholic Church. These religious schools do not feature in this project and so are
mentioned here only by way of acknowledgment. Ikastolas, though, feature very
prominently and so must be briefly explained. In the context of this project ikastolas are
private schools which follow the D-model, but as private schools they emphasize Basque
culture and Euskara language instruction more heavily than in the public setting.
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Colloquially ikastola is often used interchangeably to describe both public and private Dmodel schools. In this study I make a clear distinction mainly to provide clear delineation
between the public and private.1
4.3. CONCLUSION
The Basque region has a long history of negotiating domination and autonomy
vis-à-vis the Spanish state. Throughout all of this Euskara has become the identifier for
what it means to “be Basque”. This became especially important in light of suppression
under and resistance to the Franco regime. Following the return to democracy in 1979,
Euskara was given co-official status in País Vasco. Euskara Batua was standardized and
instituted as a language of government and instruction. It thereafter entered the education
arena as part of a unique three-model system in which school choice and enrollment is
predicated on the dominant language of instruction. Given the structure of the education
system and the importance language plays in it, this project examines the way in which
schools serve as social spaces in which nation-building projects and language policies
come together for young people as those projects are incorporated into policy. From there
it ask looks at the way in which these projects become meaningful to young people and
whether various forms of identity (Basque, Spanish, some sense of pan-European) have
significance for them.
The following chapter will begin with a discussion of why parents make the
language and education model choices that they do. Afterward, it will move into a
1

Much of the colloquial confusion comes out of the history of the ikastola system. Gardner (2002a, 2002b)
states that the original ikastolas were formed even prior to the beginning of the Civil War but began to be
clandestinely resurrected toward the end of the Franco regime. Following democratic reforms, they were
given full legality but continued to operate more or less independently of central government core
curriculum requirements. However, in 1992 the País Vasco Assembly passed educational reform laws
requiring ikastolas to adopt reforms and either enter the public system or adhere to the curriculum
guidelines for private schools. While many opted for the private system, some became public institutions
but kept their ikastola names.
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broader conversation about the impact of this language instruction on youth conceptions
of identity, belonging, politics, and territory in Bilbao and País Vasco.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
This project examines issues surrounding the relationship between language
education and the development of national identity in youth populations in the Basque
region of País Vasco in Spain. It addresses how young people formulate their sense of
identity in the context of regional autonomy and national devolution, supranationalism,
and European integration. When exploring these issues, this paper gives attention to
questions about how different layers of identity become meaningful to young people as
well as how they formulate their own sense of identity. Specifically, it asks three broad
questions in order to examine these issues. First, how are different political projects being
incorporated into language policy in País Vasco? Second, how do different nationbuilding projects become meaningful to young people in the region? Third, how do
educational institutions (schools) function as social spaces in which nation-building
projects and language policies come together for students?
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first looks at the issue of
school models and the reasons for which students are placed in a particular track. While
Gardner’s (2002a) says that there is no overarching reason to drive particular school
choices, I posit that there are four main trends that can be observed. The second section
examines the everyday language usage of youth people in Bilbao. This section examines
youth spaces in the city and explores the varying social pressures young people feel
surrounding language usage at different developmental stages and the negotiation of
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language usage in the wider social city context. The third section broadens out to
examine more macro scale issues of nationalist ideologies as internalized by these young
people and the way in which they consequentially view País Vasco as a territory of
belonging.
5.1: LEARNING EUSKARA
Language and linguistic policies are closely tied in to nation-building projects.
However, this is possibly becoming more complicated in the context of the European
Union, devolution of state power in Spain, and increasingly globalization. Interviews
with teachers, parents and students provide insight into the ways these complications are
exhibited as they make choices about school models. The three model system of
education in País Vasco is predicated on the ability of parents to choose which language
– Castilian or Euskara – is the primary method of instruction and communication in the
school. Under the law this choice is an absolute right. With the fact that Euskara is so
important to Basque identity and in light of education regimes being pushed by
nationalists and cultural preservationists, it becomes important to ask just why parents
make the choice to enroll their children in particular schools. While this project is not
focused on parents’ direct role in language and national identity inculcation in youths, it
must nonetheless be acknowledged that they have a profound role in this process. If, as I
contend and will expound on later, language education does have a role in introducing
young people to nationalist ideals and in subtly inculcating these ideals, interviews with
parents and teachers serve as a window into parents’ reasoning for introducing their
students to particular institutions and language models. This must be examined as a way
of understanding how nationalist ideals can potentially be passed down generationally. At
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the same time, I consider that this nationalist identity may not be reproduced exactly
since parents’ intentions may not matter to young people. We must also consider not just
the reasons emphasized for learning Euskara, but the perceived ability of each school
model to engage in that education. This section will then end with a brief discussion
about the different viewpoints offered about D-model schools versus ikastola attendance
when both systems on paper offer the same language track and curriculum model.
Nationalist rhetoric says that school choice and placement in Euskara language
model schools is important for preserving a sense of Basque identity unique from any
other group in Spain. Bureaucratic discussions more dryly espouse the preservation of
regional cultural and heritage in conjunction with learning Castilian as part of being a
Spanish citizen. Even the names of the ministerial departments are wrapped up in this
discussion. The language policies discussed here are overseen by the “Departamento de
Educación, Política Lingüística y Cultura” which translates in English to the “Department
of Education, Language policy, and Culture”. Education, language policy, and the
vaguely defined “culture” are all considered closely related enough that they can fall
under the purview of one minister. Outside the halls of government though, education
choices have more subtleties than bureaucratic labels would suggest. Since all students
must learn Euskara by law and different models teach it based on varying levels of
immersion, the importance that parents place on learning Euskara can play a direct role in
which model their child enters. I discuss a range of responses given to me by parents and
students as to why Euskara instruction may be important to different individuals. Of
course not all people hold it to be of equal importance and that is reflected in their
perception of the different language models and child placement in them. Whereas
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nationalist rhetoric and bureaucratic hierarchy promote Euskara education for certain
reasons, we see on the ground, at the family level, that these reasons are only part of the
picture. Parents select schools with particular language policies for a variety of reason,
some ideological but others more pragmatic. While not necessarily representative of all
viewpoints across País Vasco, the subtleties that come out in these interviews suggests
that there are complicated reasons for choosing various schools. These complications in
turn help highlight the varied ways in which young people negotiate national identity and
how traditional understandings of nationalism are complicated when viewed at the
personal level.
Because Euskara is the primary identifier of Basque identity and because País
Vasco is widely seen as a hyper-politicized region overrun with nationalists and
separatists, the perception outside the region is that choosing to place children in an
Euskara dominant school is an explicit, politically motivated statement. According to my
informants this was certainly the case upon the initial institution of the three-model
system. However, the perception today – at least within País Vasco itself – is that this is
no longer the case. Rather, this choice can also be based on depoliticized national
culture/heritage reasons that will be discussed shortly. Of course, this is not to say that
political motivation is still not one of the main causes. For those informants for whom
politicized sentiment was the driving factor though, it was very quickly evident. Adere, in
speaking about why she attended an ikastola, said very bluntly:
Yes, I am a nationalist. That is who I am. I went to [the ikastola] because it had
the best program. All of the classes are in Euskara, and Castilian only comes
when you have to take those classes. We actually got into trouble if we spoke
Castilian, and that is good because it taught people better the language. If you are
Basque, you need to know your language.
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This last sentence – “If you are Basque, you need to know your language” – is what
separates the politicized nationalist reasons for entering an Euskara-dominant school
from the depoliticized cultural/heritage reasons to be discussed in a moment. It has very
explicit connotations tied to it about what it means to be Basque, and it is said with a
hardline attitude. Argument is not acceptable. Granted, said in the context of someone
also explicitly stating that she is a nationalist, the political connotations cannot be
avoided. It is also important to note that Adere spoke so plainly and positively about
punishment for speaking Castilian. For those entering the school for politically
motivated, nationalist reasons, speaking Castilian is not just a rejection of national
identity, but speaking it in the classroom corrupts the students’ ability to learn Euskara,
the thing needed to fully assume the mantle of being Basque. It is thus important to note
that such reasons are present, even if they are not the main driving force in school choice
for all – or even a majority – of families.
The second reason that a particular school model is chosen is a vaguer sense of
culture or heritage. This is what language preservationists who are not ardent nationalistseparatists proclaim. The idea of learning Euskara in order to preserve a sense of regional
culture and heritage need not be political as hardline nationalists would have one believe.
This illustrates the way in which national identity can encompass a range of emotions and
perceptions, some stronger, some weaker. Rather than being a monolithic, political
ideology, individuals may express national sentiment across a broad spectrum reflecting
varying degrees of hardline or strong nationalism to softer emotional responses. In this
way, informants spoke of the need to learn the language because it provides a sense of
shared history. This presents what I call a depoliticized form of identity. Whereas
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nationalists use Euskara to present overtly political messages and meanings, individuals
who advocate for education in that language for cultural reasons consider themselves to
have done so apolitically. One teacher, Juana, spoke of this when she told the story of one
of her students in the ikastola where she works:
I have a student whose father is [an elected official] in PP2. He puts his children in
an ikastola because his wife is from the rural area in Bizkaia and they want all of
the children to be able to speak with their grandparents in Euskara. The mother’s
parents. He says that because it is their family history, their heritage, the children
need to know where they come from…politically he is very opposed to the
nationalists. He admits that he does not want to see País Vasco move away from
Madrid.
What Juana describes here is not just any random parent but a politically elected official
who belongs to a party that stands against everything nationalist-separatists desire.
Partido Popular is widely seen, for better or for worse, as the political descendants of the
Francoist movement. The party is widely opposed, as Juana stated, to any attempt by
nationalists to assert any form of independence or more autonomy from Madrid. Rather,
this is the party that more than any other espouses the need for centralizing and
assimilative practices in Spain. And yet, we see the father of one of her students who
publicly stands for all of these things sending his children to an ikastola because he wants
his children, who do not speak Euskara at home, to be able to learn the first tongue of
their maternal grandparents so that they can feel connection with their wider family.
Other cultural reasons that came up in interviews were less sentimental but no less
important. One of the ones that stood out most clearly in multiple interviews was the fact
that learning Euskara allows individuals understand and more easily relate to the region’s
history. Whereas things like connections with family members are emotional and tied to
relationships, ideas like historical connections are more intangible. Multiple informants
2

PP is the common abbreviation for Partido Popular, the leading center-right party in Spanish politics
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spoke about the way in which in today’s world Euskara is a minority language with little
use outside the region. However, by learning it they say, students are able to stay
connected to their homeland and regional history by being able to explore that history in
the language it was spoken and written. Unai, a university student specializing in History,
took a particularly pragmatic view of this:
“If I want to read about the history of northern Spain around cities like Bilbao, I
need to read the papers and things that it was written on in original. The writers of
documents in 1600 wrote in the language they used every day and in many places
in the Basque Country that was in Euskara. If I cannot read those documents, how
can I be a historian?”
For Unai, knowing Euskara is necessary for his ability to be a historian and researcher.
However, even informants who were not academics attempting to decipher centuries old
tomes still spoke about how knowing the language helped concretize historical
understanding. Words like “heritage” and phrases like “knowing where you come from”
peppered these conversations. Euskara knowledge was not seen as a political statement
but rather a way of grounding oneself (or one’s child) in the region from which he or she
descends. Again, this reflects a negotiation of a broad spectrum of nationalist attitudes
and positions that defy the idea of a single nationalist ideal or indoctrination. In this way,
we see both government bureaucratic rhetoric tying language to a general sense of culture
or history and hardline political ideologies like those promoted by groups such as ETA
cropping up in conversations. No one single viewpoint dominates the internalized
negotiations that are occurring but rather multiple viewpoints act as competing foci.
A third reason that came up for enrolling children in Euskara model schools was
acclimatization to the region, the practical realization that speaking Euskara makes life
easier and allows for wider social circles. It must be noted from the beginning that this
was not a huge factor for many of my informants because they and their parents all grew
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up in fairly localized contexts around the city of Bilbao or in other parts of País Vasco
close by it. However, given that emphasis was placed on it by multiple informants, it does
need to be briefly discussed. Jon, a student who moved to País Vasco while in primary
school, spoke about his parents’ decision to place him in a school that taught Euskara as
more than just a single subject:
“Yes, I was in a B-model school. My parents thought that it would be good for
me, if I am going to grow up in Bilbao, to be able to speak with everyone. Most
people speak Spanish but some people don’t. Sometimes there are signs on
buildings or the streets that are in [Euskara] and if you can’t read them, how can
you know what they say?”
Jon, as well as Paula both spoke about the need to speak Euskara in order to be
able to speak or read comfortably throughout the city. However, both stressed that this
desire to acclimate did not come out of a feeling of exclusion. Rather, they felt that it was
so that they could be more fully included. They made it clear that speaking only Spanish
was not cause for exclusion throughout most of the city because, in the words of Paula,
“everyone speaks [Castilian]”. They described speaking Euskara versus not speaking it as
a situation that is layered, not as one that created a strict social dichotomy. This does of
course raise issues about the situations in which each language is used and how to
negotiate those practices socially, and that topic will be discussed in a later chapter. Here
though it should be noted that learning Euskara can be seen not as necessity for fitting
into Basque society but rather adding depth to the experience. Again, Paula states:
“If someone in a group does not know Euskara that is OK. We can speak
Castilian. But if everyone can speak Euskara and is comfortable with it, we can do
that since some people are most comfortable in that language.”
Her statement raises questions about whether or not it is proper to defer to individuals
who are fluent in one language or the other in a group that is fluent in both tongues, but I
see the power dynamics at play here being more a facet of the individuals who are not in
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the group of friends rather than a widespread practice of marginalizing Castilian speech.
Paula, who was born to parents who do not speak Euskara, sees her fluency learned in
school as a way for her to interact more robustly with those around her.
The last of the four reasons for which parents might pursue an Euskara dominated
education model for their children is that it offers economic mobility in País Vasco.
Repeatedly informants – including those who also voiced any of the other three reasons
previously mentioned – repeatedly stated that if a parent wants their child to get a good
job, he or she needs to know Euskara. Even if parents are not fully committed to the
nationalist project, they still recognize that one of its key aspects – Euskara fluency – is
highly desirable in the region. This reiterates yet again the complex ways in which people
negotiate identities and nationalist policies. Maialena and Ainhoa, teachers at a D-model
school near the heart of Bilbao, spoke together about the importance of not only having
knowledge but fluency in Euskara:
Maialena: Why study Euskara? Because if you do not know it, you don’t get a
good job. It’s that simple. If you want simple work like being a cleaning lady,
speaking Castilian only is fine. But if you want a good paying job for which you
can get promoted – like in a bank or as a lawyer or getting a good government job
– for those kinds of things you need to know both languages.
Ainhoa: Yes. When a student graduates he needs to have that, how do you say it,
the certificate, the license from the government…that says you have the grade and
are fluent.
Maialena: It’s very true. If an employer asks you to prove your fluency and you
don’t have the certificate, you won’t get the job. Especially in the economy today,
you have to be fluent.
This issue of the current economic situation in Spain came up repeatedly in
conversations as talk turned to the need of bilingual fluency for even entry-level
positions. At the time of my fieldwork, Spain’s overall unemployment rate hovered at
just over twenty-five percent and the rate for under-30s was even more dismal, ranging
from forty-five to fifty percent. While informants spoke about how País Vasco was
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slightly better off than the rest of Spain due to the regional government’s fiscal autonomy
from Madrid, they all nonetheless spoke about how bleak the job market was. Because of
this bleakness, bilingual fluency in both Castilian and Euskara is often seen as the most
basic of marketable skills one can offer an employer. Said Nahia:
Even if you want a job working in a shop selling shirts and clothes, you need to be
able to tell the boss that you can speak [both languages]. That way he knows that
if a customer comes in you can make them feel comfortable by speaking to them
how they want.
It seems very clear that the largest factor for many parents in placing their
children in Euskara schools seems to be pragmatic in nature. They want their children to
succeed and to have viable careers as they become independent and leave home.
Knowledge of Euskara is seen as an important factor in ensuring this. Euskara is not
officially required for most jobs; however, knowledge of the language is seen as giving
an advantage, even if only a slight one, to job seekers. Not every parent saw it as the
ultimate means to an end though. While I heard fairly consistently that it is beneficial,
some also admitted that it is really only the case if individuals stay in the relatively small
geographic areas in which Euskara is widely spoken. This was summed up best in a
statement made by Begoña, a mother of three who has one child living and living outside
País Vasco, one relatively close to Bilbao, and a third not yet out of high school. She said
“It’s a good thing to know if you are going to work here in País Vasco, maybe in
Navarra, but other than [those places], it’s not as useful. My son [the oldest child]
lives in Madrid and works for a travel company organizing tours for people from
other countries. He doesn’t use Euskara and has forgotten a lot of it. My daughter
[the middle child] lives in a small town south of Bilbao though and speaks it all
the time with her boyfriend and in the streets. When [my youngest daughter]
graduates and then finishes training to be a nurse like she wants to be, she will
need it if she is going to work in País Vasco. It’s good to know if you want to
work here. If you are like [my son] though and want to work in Madrid or a
foreign country, it’s not so important for work. But it’s good for the option.”
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While arguing that learning Euskara is not necessary to achieve a good position,
Begoña nonetheless backs up the statements made by other individuals in that learning
Euskara allows for flexibility in the work force. Learning the language opens doors that
monolingualism does not necessarily provide. Fairly uniformly all of my informants
praised government efforts to also teach foreign languages in schools in order to make for
a more competitive work force. However, even while acknowledging the importance of
foreign language knowledge, bilingual fluency in Castilian and Euskara is seen as the
minimum effective attributes a young person can bring to a job. For this reason, the
largest driving factor in wanting to learn Euskara in schools is to prepare students for the
work force. Nationalist agendas, cultural heritage, and even regional acclimatization may
all play a role as well, but economic viability sits at the forefront of many people’s minds.
The current state of affairs in Spain and the wider European Union market only
exacerbate this. Schools are seen as important learning institutions, but they are not
necessarily perceived as places in which young people come to internalize national
projects. Rather, the spaces and ways in which national projects are negotiated and
internalized by young people are layered and complicated, negating the idea of a single,
solid nationalist agenda on the ground.
As previously discussed, there are several reasons that parents consider when
choosing which language model school in which to place their children. These models are
organized around the amount of instruction that occurs in each language – Castilian and
Euskara. Since the stated goal of government policy is the bilingual fluency in each
language of all students who pass through the Basque education system, the question
arises as to whether each model actually achieves that goal. For interest in this project,
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the question is even more nuanced – how do parents, teachers, and young people perceive
the effectiveness of each model? The answer to that question is fairly straightforward –
those affiliated with D-model and ikastolas consider the other two models to impart
inferior language lessons, though they give some leniency to B-model schools. There is
also a perception of difference between public D-model schools and ikastolas, but it will
be briefly discussed in the following section. The prevailing attitude among individuals
associated with the Euskara dominant models is succinctly seen in the following
statement from Udane, a student who has native fluency in Euskara and Castilian both
but has spent extensive time studying in the United States and is certified with a native
fluency in English as well:
“The people who are not in the D-model, the ikastola systems - they don’t learn
Euskara if they don’t speak it at home. It’s that simple. B-model schools are not
as bad, but because the students don’t speak Euskara all the time, because they
don’t use it at home, because it’s OK in the classroom to switch to [Castilian], it
doesn’t stick. Students in the A-model though, they get nothing. They learn
Euskara the same way Americans learn Spanish – they study for a test and then
when it’s done, they forget it all. Those students are good for saying hello and
counting to ten. Maybe saying a few colors.”
Those students in B-model schools see A-model schools as rather incapable of
imparting Euskara while acknowledging their own middle ground status as the preferred
method for children from a Castilian-speaking home as well. The B-model is perceived
by these people to be a solution for those students who enter the system from households
not speaking Euskara because it allows the students to acclimate to the new language of
Euskara without being overwhelmed by a full immersion. Jon, as previously mentioned,
moved to País Vasco with his family while he was in primary school. Part of the reason
they chose a B-model school was for the acclimatization reasons discussed earlier, but
they felt full immersion would overwhelm their son:
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“I went to a school that mixed the languages because I never spoke [Euskara]
before. In Andalucía everyone speaks [Castilian] and so I didn’t know anything
else. When I went to a school where [Euskara] was used to teach more than a
language class meant that I picked it up more sooner than in [an A-model school]
but I could still speak the language I grew up speaking.”
Those parents and students who choose A-model schools were all almost
completely monolingual in Castilian and felt that Euskara language classes provided
enough context and instruction. The perception of these schools among the other model
groups also tends to be that A-model schools are for those individuals who either are not
native to the Basque regions (i.e. emigrants from other parts of Spain or foreign
immigrants), care little for Basque heritage, or who are politically opposed to Basque
nationalism and identity politics. As has been discussed, this may not actually be the case
all the time though because there are people who fall into these categories that
nonetheless use B- or D-model schools or ikastolas. The perception nonetheless remains.
Regardless, those in these A-model schools feel that the amount of language instruction is
adequate for what is needed. Statements on the matter tend to be fairly short but focus
around the fact that because Castilian is co-official with Euskara, it is what is used by the
vast majority of Spain, and “everyone already speaks it anyway” (as stated by Eneko).
While the views on nationalist politics and identity discussions among this group did tend
to be ambivalent at the most accommodating end of the spectrum, none of the individuals
I spoke with were vehemently opposed to nationalists. More importantly in my mind, no
one, even members of the A-model affiliation group, were opposed to Euskara education
or usage. These individuals simply either did not see the need for full immersion or said
that it would be too confusing for a child from a non-native Euskara-speaking home to be
thrown into a system in which subjects other than those directly instructing Euskara
literacy and fluency were taught.
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All of this together shows that not only are the reasons for which people choose
certain models complicated, but so too are the perceptions of the models themselves.
Each group of individuals has a slightly nuanced version of the school system with which
the others are affiliated. These different perceptions also play into the school system
choice made by parents. Which language model choice a parent makes is an extremely
nuanced decision with varying perceptions of the level of fluency to be gained.
Nationalist policies and by extension the nationalist movements behind them then are
approached with the idea of choice in mind. This choice can have the emotional
connection of nationalist rhetoric behind it for some but for others it can be one of
pragmatism, indicating an idea of identity as flexible and one choice among many others
to be made as part of other decisions.
For the last part of this section, I want to briefly discuss the perceived differences
between enrolling students in the public D-model schools and a private ikastola system
that follows the same basic curriculum but generally has small fees associated with them.
Very quickly it becomes evident in conversation that while both D-model and ikastola
systems are generally chosen because of their ability to teach Euskara lessons, the
ikastola schools are seen as being slightly better at it. The reason for this perception
comes from the fact that ikastolas are seen as being more stringent in their teaching
methods and less willing to let students use Castilian outside of Castilian language and
literature classrooms. Izaro, a teacher at an ikastola, went so far as to say that students
were not even supposed to speak in Castilian on the playground because “that means they
aren’t practicing all the time like they are supposed to do at school”.

73

In addition, ikastolas have history on their side in encouraging the idea that they
are better at imparting Euskara knowledge. As discussed in Chapter III, the modern
history of the ikastola system began with clandestine structures set up in the later part of
the Franco years. Even in areas where these schools were not suppressed, they were not
encouraged and sometimes operated more as extracurricular activities than as full-fledged
schools. This history lends the idea of the ikastola an aura of fervency and authenticity.
With the imposition of co-official status and a bilingual system, the perception among
many in the population was that there were not enough teachers fluent in Euskara to
effectively teach it. Ikastolas by their very definition were private institutions that
emphasized and even reveled in their Euskara usage and knowledge. This perception still
surfaces some today in conversation. However, it also comes alongside some political
tensions associated with that history. Because ikastolas were originally clandestine, they
were seen as the bastions of ardent nationalists clamoring for separatism. According to
informants though, while this perception may still persist outside País Vasco in other
parts of Spain, it is not a widely held view within the region itself. In the words of Juana,
a teacher:
“When I was a student in the 80s, [ikastola] attendance was very much political.
My parents were nationalists and I was one too. …Today, that is not so. Today
ikastolas are more about being the best way to learn Euskara. You know if your
child goes to an ikastola that she is going to get teachers who really know the
language and will always teach in it like they are supposed to do.”
Since placement in a particular school model is a legal right of parents in País
Vasco and these decisions are centered around the dominant language of instruction,
perceptions about identity, language, and the need to emphasize education in one
language or the other are significant factors in making that choice. The reasons parents
choose one model or another vary from family to family and hinge on a variety of factors
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such as the importance parents place on Euskara instruction and why they feel it is
important or not. Furthermore, perceptions of the effectiveness of each model type at
Euskara instruction can affect the choice. Parents who stress the need for the best fluency
possible, for whatever reason, look towards D-model and ikastola schools. Those who see
it as not as important or who themselves do not speak the language and feel their children
would be overwhelmed in an Euskara-dominant school look to A- and B-models to
varying degrees. The efficacy of each model as well as the perceptions of the schools is
important to consider as we move into the next two sections of this chapter. Everyday
language use and the role of the school in that are directly tied into how students are
instructed and help form their opinions are language spaces and negotiations in the city of
Bilbao. These will be important topics discussed in the next section before finally moving
into the last portion of this chapter where political ideologies, regional identities, and
implications of Euskara language education are discussed.
5.2: EVERYDAY LANGUAGE USAGE
While the previous section discussed the ways in which school model choice are
made by parents, this section moves into an examination of the ways in which young
people actually use language on a daily basis in Bilbao. As has been covered, one of the
primary goals of the education system in País Vasco is to create a bilingual population.
While the state rhetoric is that each model type provides adequate instruction for this to
occur, perceptions in the population differ as to the truth of this ideal. Different school
models and methods of instruction are perceived to convey different levels of fluency in
Euskara. Just as there are many nuanced reasons for which people value Euskara
education and for why they choose to enroll their children in a particular model, so too is

75

actual daily usage of the language varied on the ground. Even in youth populations that
have fluency in Euskara, the actual usage of it varies from place to place and time to
time. While language preservationists argue that language instruction and fluency is the
key to saving Euskara from the danger of extinction, knowledge does not guarantee
usage. It is actual language usage that preserves a language and its richness. Therefore, it
becomes important to examine the ways in which young people actually do speak and use
Euskara and how it serves or doesn’t serve particular nation-building projects. In order to
explore this topic, this section considers three main issues. First, what social spaces do
young people inhabit in the city? The school setting may serve as the center of language
instruction, but is it seen as a primary space for young people? How do they function
socially outside of school? How does their daily language usage reflect what they learn in
school? Second, I will briefly discuss the dynamics of language usage at different stages
in young people’s development. Important questions include whether young people’s
language usage and emphasis shifts as they mature and how this is impacted by their
growing sense of personal and group identity as they move towards the age of majority.
The third and last part of this section explores how young people negotiate language
usage throughout the city of Bilbao. Outside of youth spaces, how do young people
decide what language to use at any given time? What are the cues that determine which
language is proper in a given situation? Are these language negotiations necessarily
exclusionary or are they a layered phenomenon?
If you are going to talk about both language education and daily language usage
in young people, the role of the school as a space in which young people interact must be
considered. While most of the population that inhabits school spaces on a daily basis is
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composed of young people, do they consider it one of “their” spaces? This is an
important question to ask and attempt to answer. If young people feel that the school
functions as one of their primary interactive spaces, the requirements placed on them – be
they about language usage or otherwise – do not necessarily feel imposed. If, however,
and as I argue, the school is seen not as a youth space but as one belonging to the state,
reaction against school strictures can also be seen as subtle subversion of the state.
The idea that schools function as youth spaces comes from the fact that they are in
fact occupied throughout the day mostly by young people. However, rather than being
perceived by those youths as a space in which they interact and operate socially, schools
are seen as state impositions. While admitting that social interaction does occur in these
places, youth informants generally see this as limited and not as meaningful as what goes
on outside the school. This feeling is not unique to students of any one school model or
structure in Bilbao. Whereas perceptions of each other’s schools themselves may have
varied from informant to informant, they are all acknowledged as places belonging to
someone other than the youth population. The school as an institution is seen as a space
imposed on young people by adults – the state – in an effort to regulate behavior and
learning. While this regulation is not seen as a regulation that unduly restricts young
people, it is regulation nonetheless. Similar statements on the subject came from young
people throughout the study regardless of school model or current university setting.
School is seen as a learning environment, not a social one for interaction with friends and
acquaintances. In the words of Irati:
“Schools are just a place where you go in high school because you have to.”
And again from Mikel:

77

“Youth space? No. Schools are not that. We only go to school for class and for
learning. We hang out with friends [in other places].”
And last from Nora:
“You don’t go to school to make friends or meet people. You go to learn. I may
meet some of my friends there but I know them because I hang out with them in
other places.”
These sentiments then beg the question – if the school is not seen as a social space
for young people in which they can interact freely with peers, what then are youth spaces
in Bilbao? And within these spaces, outside the strictures placed on language usage in the
schools, how do young people use Euskara and/or Castilian when in groups with their
friends? The answer to both of these questions is both simple and yet no so at the same
time. When examining the idea of youth spaces in Bilbao, asking what areas young
people feel are their own, both students and adults interviewed revealed that the city does
not really have spaces that can be considered as just belonging to youths. Rather, youth
spaces are fleeting and forme in general areas only when young people are present. These
spaces are not spaces which are universally acknowledged as belonging solely to young
people. Instead they are said to belong only at certain times. At other times these spaces
are seen as belonging to other groups specifically or the general public more broadly.
This is because the spaces seen as belonging to youths in Bilbao are formed in places
shared by multiple age groups. When asked about the concept of youth spaces, even
adults were momentarily confused by the idea that there might be concretized locations
rather than simple group congregations. Juana, when asked if her students saw school as a
youth space, explained that they did not and went on to describe what does constitute
such an area in Bilbao:
“If you are going to say that there is a [space] for young people, it is going to be
out on the streets. Especially on weekends. Teenagers go out and stand on the
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sidewalk and in the street and in parks – places like that – and they talk and play
and drink. Those are the places for young people. Adults do not go there.”
These sentiments are echoed by young people. They say that there is no real space
in Bilbao for them to go all the time. Rather, one simply hangs out with friends in
whatever public space is available and it only becomes a youth space when vacated by
other groups or when enough young people have arrived to crowd out others.
Interestingly, the one informant who did speak about moves to create spaces for young
people to go, to socialize, and to congregate other than public areas was Adere. In her
words, the groups attempting to create these spaces, rather than being government or
civic organizations, are political parties seeking to mobilize young people into youth
wings of their organizations. However, when pressed on these institutions, she, as well as
later informants questioned about them, admitted that they are limited in scope and not
well attended except by individuals who are already politically active. Otherwise young
people continue to simply occupy public areas and inhabit youth spaces that are
ephemeral at best as they form and dissipate only when the young people themselves do
so.
Regardless of where young people congregate and what they see as their own
space, we must still consider how they use language in these areas. Just as with defining
what are youth spaces is both simple and layered, so too is language usage. The spaces
are simple because they are readily acknowledged to exist but complicated because
discerning what makes them is contingent on subjective ideas of youth social practices.
Similarly, language usage in these spaces is fairly straightforward because everyone
readily admits that both Castilian and Euskara are used. However, the nuances of doing
so are much more finely focused. Some informants, especially those not as fluent in
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Euskara or who use it primarily in the school setting, talk of using only Castilian in
public. Those fluent in Euskara, who use it at home, and who consider it their mother
tongue speak about the way in which they switch between languages based on who is
present in a group or at what locale they are. This is further complicated by the fact that
Euskara is such a complex language family with a standardized form that is taught in
schools. As mentioned in Chapter III, there are several dialects, sub-dialects, and regional
variations within Euskara. On top of this is layered Batua. Udane explained the added
complexities this causes by saying:
“I feel more comfortable speaking Euskara than I do Castilian, and a lot of my
friends are the same way. But, not everyone speaks it the same. [My friend] only
learned to speak Euskara in school and so she only knows the Standard form. I
grew up speaking Biscayan, but I also know Standard and understand some other
dialects. [My other friend] is from [a small town] where they speak another
dialect that doesn’t sound like Standard, so when we all talk together, we have to
use Standard or Castilian so that [my first friend] doesn’t have a hard time
understanding.”
This specific example in a group that are all in theory fluent in the same language
and comfortable speaking it shows just how layered and complex Euskara usage can be
for young people. Young people face an extremely complex language landscape because
not only do they have to negotiate whether to use Castilian or Euskara, but they also have
to deal with the fact that Euskara itself with a layered language experience with
sometimes complex differences between dialects. Batua may address some of these issues
by introducing a standardized form that everyone is nominally fluent in having learned it
in school, but even then its unintelligibility with some of the sub-dialects and regional
variations may cause confusion for individuals who grew up speaking one of the latter in
the home. Rather than serving as a national identifier then, Euskara usage and negotiation
again reflects choices to be made.
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Outside the social spaces created by congregating youths and reflecting the
complexities that come with deciding when to use Euskara or Castilian with peers, young
people must also daily decide when to use language in the wider landscape of the city.
País Vasco is officially bilingual. According to the law, either language may be used in
any setting in the region. On paper this means that everything from interactions with
government officials to window shopping may be conducted in the language of choice for
the individual citizen. Speaking to individuals on the ground though, the actual daily
decisions about language usage are not so simple. In many settings around the city, one
language or the other is given preference over the other. This can be gleaned both from
interviews with informants and through observation methods as you walk through the
city. Such navigation is part of the everyday experience for residents in the city. What
drives the choice is sometimes overt clues, sometimes mere pragmatism. The young
people interviewed referred to the latter when they discussed the use of Castilian in the
main areas of the city. Citing the fact that these are the most highly trafficked areas with
the possibility of interacting with people who are not from País Vasco, including hordes
of tourists, Castilian is used to converse in places like stores and cafes. However, when in
smaller, areal context such as peripheral neighborhoods or localized establishments,
implicit clues, aside from auditory indications, are used. Calling to mind Billig’s
description of banal flagging, informants talked about how the subconsciously slipped
from one language to another. Leire said:
“When I go into a bar I just know what language to use. Sometimes it is Euskara,
sometimes it is Castilian. …No, [it isn’t prompted].”
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However, just because there is this negotiation does not mean that there are repercussions
for speaking the “other” language than is used in a certain setting. To hold the idea that
language usage in this context is exclusionary would be misguided. While informants did
talk about the way in which picking and insisting on one language can be a way to make
a statement, they also talked about the way in which an individual can slip between
tongues without worry in public settings. In fact, in unfamiliar settings or in those highly
trafficked areas just mentioned, using Castilian as a safety measure is normal. To be very
clear, “safety” in this context does not mean that individuals fear for their actual physical
well-being but rather they wish to avoid any misunderstanding. While many informants
said the same individually, interview sessions with multiple people were particularly
enlightening in this regard as people discussed among themselves the way in which they
approach this issue. Udane, June, and Irati and Oier and Unai talked extensively about the
way one approaches things like café counters or cash registers, speaking Castilian out of
politeness in case someone does not know Euskara. However, there was consensus that, if
the individual used Euskara, the conversation could switch to that language with no
problem, or vice versa as needed. In this way, young people spoke of daily negotiations
in the public sphere not as a political statement but as a matter of practicality and social
niceties. Hardline political ideologues on either side of the issue may maintain usage of
either Castilian or of Euskara as making a statement about identity or beliefs, but to many
young people, everyday usage in the city is much simpler. It does not have to have deeper
meaning other than speaking comfortably with friends or ensuring a coffee order is
placed correctly. Language usage does not even have to be “pure” with every informant
acknowledging uniformly that pidgin forms are used constantly as vocabulary from one
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language or the other constantly bleeds over into conversations held in the other tongue.
Even though Euskara is considered a defining characteristic of the region and the Basque
people group, individuals acknowledge that usage can be varied on a personal level.
Markel, who admits to speaking only the most basic amounts of Euskara, had this to say:
“It’s not bad if you don’t speak Euskara. I don’t feel uncomfortable if I’m in a
neighborhood [in Bilbao] or in [a little town] in the countryside where everyone
speaks Euskara. It’s OK because everyone knows that not everyone speaks it.”
One other issue to briefly examine is the way in which language usage shifts in
young people as they mature. This conversation primarily concerns the usage among
children who are enrolled in Euskara-dominant schools. What language do they use as
they move through the school system given a choice? Does it shift through time? If so,
what is the reason for this shift? Even though, as previously discussed, these young
people do not on a daily basis see language usage in public settings as a political
statement and more as a matter of convenience or practicality, it must also be
remembered that the young people interviewed have reached the age of majority. These
are individuals who are already finished with their primary and secondary education and
so are beyond the requirements that they have to use both Euskara and Castilian both in
formal settings each day. For the children still under these strictures though, maturation is
coupled with the desire to act against these imposed guidelines in the proverbial teenaged
rebellion. Whereas those who are of age and have graduated have the right to make their
own language choices, students in school do not have this freedom. Their behavior is
regulated by the state in the form of language usage. However, while they may act
against these rules, they do not necessarily see it as an act of state subversion but rather as
a form of social negotiation and maturation. Juana, in describing her students, talks about
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the way in which her ikastola prohibits the use of Castilian outside of specific classes as a
way of encouraging full immersion.
“When [the students] are in the primary classes, they only talk in Euskara like
they are supposed to do. When they get a little older though, in the [middle
school] grades they start to have conversations in Castilian when they are talking
to themselves or on the playground. They aren’t supposed to do it but they think it
makes them look cool. That’s because, you know, all the movie stars and football
players and people like that speak Castilian and that’s just part of being cool.”
This attitude illustrates the complex issues surrounding both language instruction
and the way in which Euskara education efforts battle the hegemonic forces of Castilian
language society and media. In order to preserve the language, Basque governments
instituted Euskara education models. However, because the region is still situated within
the wider Spanish media system in which nationally produced programs are made in
Castilian, these efforts are complicated by constant bombardment of Castilian
programing. This again goes back to Billig’s arguments about the ways in which every
day experiences subtly reinforce or complicate nationalizing projects, even language
education. However, it also illuminates the complicated negotiations in which young
people make daily. While older youths speak of language usage in terms of being
comfortable or issues of practicality in daily interactions, they also talk about the way in
which minors see language as an issue of social standing. Media figures do not use
Euskara; old people and politicians do. However, as they reach the age of maturity,
juvenile notions of language as “cool” begin to shift as people enter the wider society as
citizens. Instead of seeing the language as a way to affiliate themselves with glitz, it
assumes more mundane meanings that arise as they order their morning coffee.
Negotiating language choices on a daily basis is a multi-layered event for young
people in Bilbao. Within the spaces that youth populations consider their own, there are
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complicated internal decisions to be made in social settings as they choose between
speaking Euskara, Castilian, or some hybridized form of the two. This is complicated
even further by the fact that Euskara Batua – Standard Basque – is the official form of the
language but not necessarily what is spoken in the home or in every pocketed region of
País Vasco. The spaces that young people inhabit only further blur this picture as socalled “youth spaces” in Bilbao are ephemeral at best, mirroring as it were the constantly
shifting language usage in them. Instead, young people are seen to interact mostly within
public spaces, only gaining their own areas when there are large crowds of them present
and the premises are vacated by other groups. Outside of these instances though, young
people in the city still have complicated decisions about language usage to make as they
perform everyday activities. However, rather than making this decision based on overt
statements about identity, young people talk about choosing languages in public settings
based on comfort and practicality, acknowledging that even if the person in question
takes a hardline view of Basque identity and language preservation one way or the other,
the region is still nonetheless multilingual. Finally, in addition to making these social
negotiations, young people have strong internal decisions to make as they mature. Living
as they do in a minority-language region, they are bombarded on a daily basis by media
in the dominant language group. The process of deciding which language to use in social
situations becomes complicated as they attempt to decipher which language brings more
social prestige. This becomes more complex as they come closer to the age of majority
and economic issues begin to surface as language fluency and usage becomes a matter of
employment pragmatism. In summation, the daily choices made by young people about
young people in their spaces and in public spaces are complicated and must sometimes be
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tenderly negotiated, but the reasoning behind their decisions often boil down to mundane,
banal experiences rather than political or national ideology.
5.3: NATIONALIST IDEOLOGIES AND TERRITORIALITY
The last section of this chapter will explore two issues related to the manifestation
of nationalist ideologies in young people. The first thing that must be discussed is the
affiliation that young people profess politically. Euskara is so often that marker used to
define being Basque and it is defended and promoted with religious fervor by hardline
nationalists. Because of this, they promote Euskara education programs and large
portions of the population, especially young people, now speak the language. However,
the question arises as to whether these same young people who are being educated
because of this preservationist and nationalist agenda also affiliate with nationalist
parties. If there is a lack of sympathy for nationalist sympathy, the question begins to
arise as to why these policies are pursued. Following that conversation, we must turn to
the idea of País Vasco’s territoriality. As discussed in Chapter I, nationalism is directly
tied to the concept of territorial integrity. A group of people cannot make a national claim
unless they also have a territorial homeland, real or imagined, to claim as their own.
Basque nationalists not only have a well-defined homeland but also wield large amounts
of effective power in it, receiving large concessions of autonomy from the central
government for the Spanish portions of it. This makes it important to examine how young
people, as the future generations inheriting this territory, conceive of País Vasco and of
its relationship with Spain, as well as the supranational influence of the European Union.
País Vasco is seen by many people in the region as an area separated from the rest
of Spain not just by its separatist political beliefs but also by a perceived predominant
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left-of-center stance that differentiates it from other regions in the country. The young
people I spoke to talked about how, especially amid the current financial crisis, País
Vasco stood slightly above the rest of the country on the basis its fiscal autonomy and
protected social safety net. While much of the rest of Spain is forced to undergo stringent
fiscal austerity measures in order to receive the funds it needs to remain solvent, País
Vasco is able to mitigate some of the more painful such measures within its own borders.
For young people who express nationalist viewpoints, this is only a further example of
the corrosive influence of Madrid that retaining autonomy has helped avoid. Udane,
speaking bluntly, said:
“These other regions, they are having huge problems right now because the
Spanish government is able to tell them what to do all the time and they don’t
have control over their own money. Here, that is not the case. Our government is
able to control its own spending and so we are able to protect things that matter to
us like the health care system.”
These views mirrored those of other young people who stated that País Vasco is
better off than other places in Spain or even in Europe because of the way the nationalists
were able to garner enough power from the central government that they have fiscal
autonomy. This bodes well for the largest nationalist party in País Vasco, the moderate
center-left Partido Nacionalista Vasco. PNV has in recent years rejected calls for outright
secession, touting as they do the security that comes with staying in the larger state entity
that is Spain. However, though, they do not advocate and in fact actively resist any calls
for surrendering some of their autonomy back to Madrid. Young people, even proclaimed
nationalists such as Udane, admit that while they like the idea of an independent País
Vasco, they can also see given the current economic landscape how devastating
independence would be. Similarly though, those students who are verbally reject
nationalist sentiments still give credit to those political parties for the stability that comes
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to the region from their influence. Markel, describing himself as “probably more
conservative than anything else” said:
“I’m not political. I don’t think we should leave Spain. But [the nationalists] have
made [this] one of the best places to live in Spain. Our banks haven’t had to be
bailed out and there are fewer unemployed people here so I’m OK with them if
they are in power.”
The last issue raised here by Markel of the nationalists being in power is also an
important point to consider. The last Basque government was a coalition of the
conservative Partido Popular and the socialist Partido Socialista Obrero Español designed
specifically to unseat the PNV after almost 30 uninterrupted control as the majority or
dominant coalition partner in government. While PNV received the largest portion of the
votes in that election, they won only a plurality in the regional assembly. Because of this,
a coalition of erstwhile opponents formed and kept them from power, only to then be
saddled with the blame for the downturn that did occur in País Vasco. While it was still
not as bad as the rest of Spain, the blame for hardship was transferred to the coalition
parties that were widely seen as having betrayed their principles for the sake of petty
politics and their own political ill-will towards nationalists. The anger at these coalition
partners manifested itself not just in concerns about the economy, though. Many of the
young people I spoke with saw PP, descendant of the ruling conservative party under
Franco, in particular has having been especially politically devious because of the
longstanding antipathy they had towards PSOE. Reflecting the way in which politics in
País Vasco is indeed more complex than just arguments about regional autonomy and
language issues, some informants mentioned in particular how País Vasco is a more
socially liberal region than others in Spain and that they were afraid PP would attempt –
at the national and the regional level – to cut services like healthcare and public transit,
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limit reproductive rights, and roll back social initiatives such as gay marriage that had
been introduced in the previous decade. All of this though still took place within wider
conversations about the role of the economy and the European experience.
When asked how individuals felt about the European Union and whether there
was any affiliation to it, informants of all groups laughed. To these individuals Europe is
simply an economic project. Attempts to spur considerations of social or civic programs
were met with confusion while questions about Europe’s directives on regional language
protections were met with blank stares at best and denial that such things exist at worst.
Indeed, the idea that there might be some sense of European identity in youth populations
was laughable. While expressing appreciation for things like open borders or educational
opportunities that came with wider integration, these were still discussed in economic
terms. And, given the time period in which this field work was conducted, much of that
conversation centered on the perception that foreign countries, Germany in particular,
were imposing their will on countries like Spain. Oier went so far as to reiterate the joke
that Germany had finally found through the European Union the way to conquer Europe
without engaging in open warfare.
In the end, the political beliefs to which young people in País Vasco ascribe are
complex. Even individuals who do not agree with nationalist viewpoints accept that they
have done good things for the region. Other political parties, in particular the
conservative PP, are blamed for current economic hardships felt throughout the region
and the wider country. The idea that young people could have a wider sense of European
identity or affiliation outside of economic interests was ludicrous to many and puzzling to
others. However, these conversations must still be taken in context of the wider economic
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crisis that was paralyzing the continent at this time. Regardless, the fact that individuals
hold these views is only beneficial to nationalist parties at this time, even if not to be
cause of nationalism. They are seen as the antithesis of the system that caused financial
meltdown and the guarantors of the current structural regime that mitigated the crisis on
País Vasco by ensuring fiscal autonomy. This in turn helps foster a sense of moderated
nationalism even among individuals who are not themselves ardent Basque nationalists.
Rather than seeing parties such as PNV as wild-eyed separatists, they are seen as a party
which acts to safeguard the region from wider potential ruin by financial manipulation.
While this trend of moderate nationalism must be viewed through the lens of the current
situation in Europe, it nonetheless in the short term speaks volumes for the cause of
nationalism. Rather than advancing nation-building projects, nationalism seem to have
fallen by the wayside in this context.
In addition to how young people identify politically, I want to end by discussing
the idea of País Vasco as a space and how this can be influenced, however subtly, by
language. To begin, the idea of a Basque homeland is tied into the language itself. Mark
Kurlansky writes that the Euskara term for the greater Basque Country made up of all
seven historic provinces is “Euskal Herria”. Rather than translating literally as “Basque
Country”, it roughly translates as “Land of the Euskara speakers”. Similarly, the Euskara
term for someone of Basque descent, “Euskaldun” translates roughly to “Euskara
speaker”. These words, internalized every time they are spoken, help inculcate the idea
that someone is Basque by speaking Euskara and that those people and that language are
tied directly to the ground on which they stand. Embedded in the language itself is the
necessary territorial claim needed for nationalism. This is not always so overtly stated,
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but sometimes references to the territorial distinctions do come up in conversation with
young people.
One of the simplest questions I asked my informants during their interviews was
where they tell people they are from if they are (or imagined they would be) traveling
outside of País Vasco, particularly in a foreign country. The responses were surprising.
While one would expect the vocally nationalist students to proclaim their loyalty to País
Vasco, it came out that most everyone began by saying that they would say they are from
“the city of Bilbao in País Vasco”. While a few informants hedged the bluntness of this
statement by immediately qualifying it as being in Spain, one informant, Udane, was
incredibly blunt and also interesting given her widespread travels in both Europe and the
United States, the latter of which included two separate yearlong living experiences:
“Where am I from? I tell [people] I am from the city of Bilbao in País Vasco, the
Basque Country.”
William: What if they don’t know where that is? Do you…
“I say País Vasco is an area on the coast between France and Spain, and if they
ask more or are curious, I explain that well technically we are inside Spain but
that our part is different. That we have our own laws and government and, and
that we’re different from the rest of Spain.”
Very few of my informants were so blunt as to say that País Vasco is a territory
between France and Spain with clarification only if prompted. However, the idea that the
region is viewed as unique comes out often in conversation, sometimes also with
qualifying statements such as, “Not that the rest of Spain would agree with me, of
course.” This uniqueness is embedded in the language itself, important again because of
the mandatory language education all children undergo. Whether a child is placed in an
A-model, Castilian dominant school or a strict ikastola that punishes children for
speaking anything aside from Euskara outside language and literature classrooms, the fact
that they must all learn at least the basics of the language helps internalize this idea of
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language, people, and land being all tied together. In this way, language education, while
preserving the language and culture of the Basque people, also subtly inculcates
nationalist ideas in children. While most likely not envisioned that way by the first protoBasque speaker, this notion means that so long as the language is spoken, it has potential
to exacerbate any efforts to centralize País Vasco with Spain or any other power that
seeks to limit its autonomy. This bodes well for those attempting to pursue nationalist
agendas and speaks volumes as to why individuals such as Francisco Franco wanted to
stamp out this ancient language.
5.4: CONCLUSIONS
Language education policies in País Vasco have been put in place so that parents
can choose what school their child attentions based on the various levels of immersion in
Euskara and Castilian in which their child is taught. While nationalists and many outside
the region see choosing Euskara dominant education as a statement of national identity,
many people – parents, teachers, and students – today view it somewhat differently.
Nationalist political leanings to have an impact in some cases, but other pragmatic ideals
also come into play. Whether it is an attempt to make a child more appealing to a
potential employer or an attempt to acclimate to society a new region, there are other
competing reasons for emphasizing language fluency. There are also a variety of
positions on the type of school model that meets the needs of these various goals. At the
same time, young people are constantly negotiating the linguistic landscape and choosing
to speak in one language or the other. The shifting youth landscape of the city mirrors
this shifting linguistic usage.
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The development of youth identity in País Vasco is affected by a myriad number
of factors. Rather than adopting a singular national project as their own, young people
position themselves through negotiation of these competing interests. This has profound
implications for the future of nationalist movements in the region because youths are not
adopting wholesale the monolithic or singular ideals pronounced by either Spanish or
Basque national projects. Rather, nationalist policies and politics are again viewed
through a pragmatic lens as they are seen to have counter-balanced centralizing policies
from Madrid that helped contribute to the current state of economic deprivation in the
country. This has a moderating effect on nationalist politics which become less separatist
but at the same time prolong them as the parties promoting nationalist viewpoints are
seen as the vanguard of regional autonomy and fiscal stability.
.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Nationalism is concept of identity tied to place and group sovereignty. It
suggests that the group making a national claim has a shared origin and common destiny,
it is inherently political, and it is directly tied to the idea of a group homeland. While
some theorists tie the development of nationalist sentiment to ancient roots, this project
adopts the modernist viewpoint that nationalist projects are much more recent endeavors
that have been constructed for political or ideological purposes. Advocated for and
imposed on a populace by political elites, these national projects are homogenizing forces
that seek to suppress competing identities. Part of this includes the establishment of
vernacular languages and the suppression of regional variants in order to impose a more
common sense of uniformity. Part of this struggle includes the standardization of the
education system and linguistic teaching practices. However, in today’s increasingly
interconnected world, national projects are challenged by globalizing or supranational
forces. In the European Union we see efforts made to preserve regional languages and
identities as part of the EU’s mantra of diversity, inclusion, and multiculturalism. This
creates a large series of tensions between the substate, state, and EU levels as different
national projects simultaneously act alongside and against each other. In this middle of all
of this we see young people growing up and having to negotiate the various meanings
and identities associated with each political project as they are pronounced in public and
educational spheres.
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This is particularly the case in the Basque region of northern Spain. It has a long
history of nationalist and separatist movements. The Basque people have inhabited their
land since before recorded history, and they speak a unique language – Euskara – that has
become the marker by which people most identify with being part of this group. Over the
course of modern history, there have been attempts made to both preserve and to suppress
this regional language in the face of the dominant Castilian tongue in Spain. The
homogenizing national forces of the central government’s policies were particularly
profound in the middle nineteenth century under the auspices of the Franco regime.
Today the situation stands so that País Vasco, one of Spain’s seventeen Autonomous
Communities comprised of the historic Basque provinces of Bizkaia, Araba, and
Gipuzkoa – places the two languages in co-official status with each other. This means
that both Castilian and Euskara may be used in any public setting, official or informal,
with full legal rights. As part of this umbrella policy, education policies have been put in
place that allow for curriculum instruction in varying levels of immersion in each
language with the proviso that language instruction courses much be offered in both
languages no matter the school model. Basques nationalists trumpet this policy as a way
to preserve Basque heritage and identity in the face of Madrid’s hegemonic power and
influence. It is also held up as an example of how País Vasco is able to govern itself
given widespread autonomy from Spain. Meanwhile the Spanish government marks it as
an example of how the state recognizes differences in regions that yet still fall under the
idea of Spanish identity.
Because language is key to Basque nationalist rhetoric, its usage and education
can become very political. It is therefore important to study the ways in which these
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education policies play out in daily circumstances and the way in which individuals
affected actually perceive and react to them. Young people, being those most directly
impacted by these policies, are therefore the ideal focus of such study. This work draws
on a series of interviews with parents, teachers and students as they were asked about
education policies, language usage, perceptions of the Basque education system, and the
ways in which they see themselves and País Vasco situated in the world of Spain and the
wider European context. The information gathered is intriguing. Instead of adhering to
rigid senses of identity as propounded by national elites, it appears that young people in
particular negotiate competing identities on a daily basis through a series of choices
surrounding political opinions, language usage, and social interaction. Rather than
displaying overt tendencies toward one national project or the other, they describe the
way in which País Vasco is separate and yet integral to Spain and vice versa. Traditional
hardline nationalists are undercut as these individuals discuss not the need for
independence from Spain but how the status quo of regional autonomy has helped blunt
the impacts of financial depression rampant throughout the rest of the country. At the
same time though, there seems to be little attachment to Europe other than the fact that it
offers economic opportunities. Just as school model choice seems to be viewed
pragmatically in many cases, so too does the idea of European interconnectedness with
little attachment to the idea of European civic ideals.
Traditional understandings of nationalism then are becoming troubled in País
Vasco. Negotiated identities that are affected by daily practices do not fit within the
understanding of nationalism as constructed and imposed by elites. In its place
individuals, and particularly young people, sort through competing rhetorics and tensions
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to adopt practices that nationalists may claim as their own – such as language usage –
with an eye for pragmatic decision-making. However, in adopting these practices and
identities, young people simultaneously give a nod to nationalist movements by
acknowledging their role in society around them. In the Basque region in particular, this
plays out so that young people may not express the secessionist views of hardline
separatists but they nonetheless acknowledge the perceived ways in which nationalist
governments have benefited their region. Language usage and education play a role in
inculcating nationalist identities and sentiments, but this inculcation does not necessarily
have the profound impact for which nationalists might hope. They receive continued
support, but it is a moderate support that views these identities as part of a series of
practical choices.
These results have implications for the study of nationalism and national,
especially in Europe. Complicated though the current state of affairs is by the pressures
of extreme economic turmoil, we must begin to ask what the future of nationalism is. Is
nationalism dead? I would argue not, but the way in which it is viewed, internalized, and
acted out is shifting. Further work is needed to explore this idea, and a more wideranging study in the País Vasco and the city of Bilbao might yet yield further nuances to
this idea. Nationalism is still an important force in the region, but the ways we see its
practices being enacted are shifting. The language of Euskara is still an important
identifier for individuals in the region, but there are now many perceived reasons for
achieving fluency in it other than to make a political or cultural statement.
.
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